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YOU CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU: AN
EXAMINATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PORTABILITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO JOB
LOCK AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRACT
Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich*

PART I: INTRODUCTION

A. Overview
Increasingly, scholars have been calling for new employment
policies and benefit delivery systems that are more in sync with our
modem economy and employment relationships. This article explores
the regime of employer-sponsored benefits and investigates those areas
where benefit portability stands as a barrier to worker mobility, thus
leading many workers to become "job-locked."
Beginning with an explanation of the changing terms of the
psychological contract in the American workplace, this article explores
its implications for employee benefit portability and the problem of job
lock. Partly in response to, and partly independent of the job lock
problem, legislators and employers have implemented changes over the
last several decades that have had the overall effect of increasing
employee benefit portability. This article probes the extent of those
accomplishments, and identifies those areas that still remain to be
adequately addressed. Finally, this article discusses possible solutions to
the job lock problem, along with their associated costs and implications
for the broader system of benefits.
* Employee Benefits Analyst, Xerox Corporation. B.S., Cornell University School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, 1996; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2002. The author would
like to thank Katherine V.W. Stone and Lawrence M. Becker for their inspiration and assistance
with this article.
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While employers provide various types of benefits, this article
focuses on the two benefits most associated with job lock: pensions and
health insurance. The article addresses only full-time private sector
employees whose employer plans are governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' The discussion does
not address plans sponsored by governmental employers, churches, or
retirement savings arrangements connected with employers that are
nonprofit organizations, such as educational institutions.
B. PsychologicalContractand Portability
"It is yesterday's news that the terms and conditions under which
people work are changing."2 For more than sixty years, American
employment policies have been predicated on a view that work
arrangements are long-term relationships between large firms and their
employees.' Today's labor force and employment practices, however,
vary considerably from this traditional picture.4
"'[F]orces of change have had a profound impact on the nature of
the employment relationship and have caused a shift in the expectations
and responsibilities for both employers and employees-a change in the
psychological contract."' 5 The psychological contract is a term used to
characterize the mutual expectations and obligations that employees,
employers, and society have for work relationships Psychological
contracts are formed because employment contracts are typically
incomplete; bounded rationality limits individual information seeking
and a changing organizational environment makes it impossible to
specify all conditions of employment contracts in advance.'
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C. (2001)). Title 11of ERISA of 1974 amended scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2001). Together, ERISA and the retirement plan provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code comprise the law governing retirement plans.
2.

MELISSA

W.

BARRINGER

&

GEORGE

T.

MILKOVICH,

CHANGING

EMPLOYMENT

CONTRACTS: THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN COMPENSATION, BENEFITS AND

JOB SECURITY ON EMPLOYEE OUTCOMES 3 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Sch. of Indus.

& Labor Relations, Cornell Univ., Working Paper No. 95-14, 1995), available at
http://www.ilr.comell.edu/depts/CAHRS/.
3. Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America's Social Contract in Employment: The Role
of Policy, Institutions, and Practices,75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137, 139 (1999).
4. Id.
5. William H. Wagel & Hermine Zagat Levine, HR '90: Challenges and Opportunities,HR
FOCUS, June 1,1990, at 18, available at 1990 WL 2517440.
6. Sometimes referred to as the social contract.
7. Kochan, supra note 3, at 138.
8. BARRINGER & MILKOVICH, supra note 2, at 4.
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Consequently, employees form expectations about a bundle of returns
(such as pay, benefits, and job security) that they will receive in
exchange for a bundle of expected contributions (such as performance
levels, flexibility, and attendance). 9
The old psychological contract, under duress today, grew up over
the decades following World War II, when an expanding economy
produced rising expectations in society and at the workplace.' ° That
contract included the expectation that earnings would rise in tandem
with increasing productivity and that hard work, good performance, and
loyalty would be rewarded with security, fair treatment, and dignity."
Increased firm tenure was accompanied by an expectation of certain
"'property rights"' to a job; employees expected job and income security
to accumulate with tenure and produce "an upward sloping age-earning
2
profile, rising standards of living, and savings for retirement."'
Organization restructuring, however, has profoundly affected the
nature of work and the relationship between employer and employee.' 3
In traditional, paternalistic work arrangements, companies could reward
employees' hard work and loyalty with lifetime employment.' 4 "In
today's more market-oriented climate, a company cannot promise to take
care of its employees from cradle to grave."' 5
Likewise, employees no longer plan to stay with one employer
throughout their careers. According to a recent study by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the average worker holds 9.2 jobs from ages eighteen to
thirty-four.16 In an attempt to measure employee loyalty, Walker
Information and Hudson Institute recently polled approximately two
thousand workers nationwide." Their survey concludes that only onefourth of employees consider themselves to be loyal and committed to
their organization, while fully one-third of employees are neither
committed to their organization nor planning to stay. 8 Another survey

9. Id.
10. Kochan, supra note 3, at 138.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citation omitted).
13. Wagel & Levine, supra note 5, at 18.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Average U.S. Worker Holds 9.2 Jobs From Ages 18 to34, BLS Study Finds, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 26, 2000), http://www.shrm.org/hmews/articles/bna0426d.htm.
17. Dave Murphy, Take a Bite Out of Your Job Turnover, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 16, 2000, at
18.

Id.
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revealed that 15% of employees in the year 2000 expected to leave their
jobs voluntarily to join another company by the end of that year.19
In response to these changes, scholars are calling for new labor and
employment policies that will "reconstruct the social contract between
the American workforce and employers in ways that address the needs
and realities of a modem economy and society."20 Thomas Kochan, for
example, believes that an integral part of this reconstruction will be for
the country "to modernize the labor and employment policies carried
over from the New Deal era," and to "foster innovations in labor unions,
labor market institutions, corporations, and in their relationships." 2' He
believes the starting premise for these changes is to replace the standard
employment model with a more accurate view of employment
arrangements in today's economy.22 Accordingly, in Kochan's view,
employment policies should be modified to anticipate and support
mobility across employers.23 He calls for new policies with the twin
goals of reducing the costs to employees of changing jobs and lowering
the costs for employers of hiring and developing new employees. 24
C. From Employment Security to Employability Security
One emerging component of the new psychological contract is the
idea that long-term "employment security" with a single firm is being
replaced by "employability security" across firms.25 In writing about the
new psychological contract, Rosabeth Moss Kanter proposes a model
"employability" contract, by which the firm promises to upgrade
workers' skills and to help provide new job opportunities if those at the
firm disappear.26 Some large companies have adopted this phrase,
representing the notion that the firm will use "measures that increase a
person's probability of making a successful job transition." 2 ' General

19.

Jeff Pelline, 15 Percent of Employees Resolve to Change Jobs, at http://cnetnews.com

(last visited Apr. 10, 2000).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Kochan, supra note 3, at 137.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.

25.

MARINA v.N. WHITMAN, NEW WORLD, NEW RULES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE

AMERICAN CORPORATION 62 (1999).

26. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 569 (2001) (citing ROSABETH
Moss KANTER, ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 192 (1997)).
27. WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 62.
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Electric, for example, has a policy of offering "employability, rather than
the security implied by a career.,28
Companies have been slow to adopt "employability security,"
based on the traditional view that teaching workers marketable skills
only leads them to leave the company for jobs at other firms.29 Ironically,
however, failure to teach marketable skills can actually increase the
employer's turnover in the long-run.3 ° As companies have come to the
realization that employees are leaving regardless, they have started to
embrace the idea of "employability security," because if an employer
can provide employees training, job skills, and opportunities, employees
will stay longer.3'
With employability security becoming the norm, Katherine Stone
believes that this new system of employment relationships is threatening
to undermine the private welfare state.32 She notes that with
"boundaryless careers" replacing job security, those workers with
employer-provided insurance often lose health insurance and unvested
pension benefits "each time they move from one employing
establishment to another."33 A critical component of employability
security is the portability of key employee benefits.34 Rosabeth Moss
Kanter urges firms to develop standard benefits policies that ensure
portability, to enable workers to function in the new employment
setting 3.
D. Job Lock
A 2000 survey measuring employee loyalty3 6 concluded that as
many as 39% of employees are "trapped" in their current organizations,
meaning that they plan to stay, although they are not committed to the
organization. 37 Employees may feel trapped for various reasons, such as
28. BARRINGER & MILKOVICH, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29. Murphy, supra note 17, at J-1.
30.

MARK ROEHLING ET AL., THE NATURE OF THE NEW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP(S): A

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTITIONER AND ACADEMIC LITERATURES

12 (Ctr. for Advanced

Human Res. Studies, Sch. of Indus. & Labor Relations, Cornell Univ., Working Paper No. 98-18,
1998), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/depts/CAHRS/.
31. Murphy, supra note 17, at J-1.
32. Stone, supra note 26, at 616.
33. Id.
34.

WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 173.

35.
36.
37.

Stone, supra note 26, at 569 (citing KANTER, supra note 26, at 192).
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Murphy, supra note 17, at J-1.
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limited education or skills, or because they are tied to the organization
by "golden handcuffs," such as stock options." For many workers,
however, the greatest barrier to job change is the loss of employer-based
benefits, such as pensions and health insurance.39 This reduction in job
mobility due to the non-portability of benefits is the phenomenon known
as "job lock." °
Job lock can be undesirable, both for employers that want
employees to leave, and for employees who would prefer to change
jobs.4 Employers have traditionally designed benefit plans to cut
turnover costs and promote retention. Some human resources
professionals argue that this practice may not be wise, because it is more
crucial for companies to keep committed employees than trapped
employees who display less desirable behaviors.42 Another challenge in
developing the new employment policies will therefore be to define a
career concept that strikes a balance between making long service
attractive for top contributors and allowing sufficient portability and
choice for those not interested in long service. 43
Job lock also has implications for the economy-wide efficiency of
labor markets. 44 "[F]ree labor market mobility enables workers to obtain
employment where they are most productive ....
" Job lock may cause
employees to forgo job opportunities in which a better match between
the worker and the employer would enable the worker to perform his or
her job more effectively.4 6 "[I]mmobility due to disparities in the
availability or scope of health insurance across employers can eliminate
potential gains in productivity and income, adversely affect worker
satisfaction, and alter the volume and quality of goods and services
produced.,47 The efficiency of the economy may suffer if individuals

38.

Id.

39.

WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 173.

40.

Kanika Kapur, The Impact of Health on Job Mobility: A Measure of Job Lock, 51 INDUS.

& LAB. REL. REV.282, 282 (1998).
41.

Oversight of Tax Law Related to Health Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On

Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 41 (1998) (statement of Paul
Fronstin, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate & Director, Health Security & Quality Program,
Employee Benefit Research Institute) [hereinafter FronstinStatement].
42. Murphy, supra note 17, at J-l.
43. Andrew S. Richter, Compensation Management and Cultural Change at IBM: Paying the
People in Black at Big Blue, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., May/June 1998, at 51.

44. Alan C. Monheit & Philip F. Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory and
Evidence, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 68, 68 (1994).
45.
46.
47.

Id.
FronstinStatement, supra note 41, at 41.
Monheit & Cooper, supra note 44, at 68.
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remain in their current positions solely to maintain their employerprovided benefits.48
Scholars have debated the actual incidence of job lock, and a
precise measurement is unknown. While at least one study found that
"job lock is small and statistically insignificant," 49 most studies that
support the job lock hypothesis report a 20% to 40% reduction in
mobility rates attributable to the phenomenon. °
Almost fifteen years ago a report, called Work and Change: Labor
Market Adjustment Policies in a Competitive World,5 identified these
very problems we are faced with today. This report concluded that
displaced workers suffer a loss of benefits due to plan design orientation
toward career-long employment with the same firm, which in turn
discourages mobility outside the firm. 2 In response, the report called for
a fundamental re-examination of pension portability and medical
insurance continuation.53 This article takes on that examination in the
forthcoming discussion, beginning with a description of the origin of the
current benefits system, and then an examination of the movements that
have been made in the direction of portability, the shortfalls of those
movements, and some possibilities for the future.
E. A Brief History of Employer-ProvidedBenefits
Today the provision of employee benefits has become standard fare
in employment arrangements. 4 Most employment-based benefits, such
as pensions and health insurance, are provided voluntarily by employers
with government support in the form of favorable tax treatment. The
fact that more than 80% of all private insurance in the United States is
currently provided 56through employers, however, is "at least partly a
historical accident.,

48. Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and Individual Labor Marker Decisions, NBER
REP., Winter 1994/1995, at 8.
49. Kapur, supra note 40, at 296.
50. Monheit & Cooper, supra note 44, at 84.
51. Adjustment Policiesfor Displaced Workers May Require Benefits-Changes, Report Says,
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2070 (Dec. 15, 1986).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 3 (5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter EBRI].
55. Id.
56. WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 174-75.
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A few companies initially introduced most of the benefits with
which we are familiar near the turn of the last century. 7 In 1898, welfare
capitalists introduced profit sharing and employee services,58 and
"[p]ensions, guaranteed income plans, life insurance and savings
plans... introduced in varying degrees in the early 1900's."59 The
federal government began using its taxing power to encourage the
provision of employee benefits in the early 1900's, providing incentives
for employment-based pension plans in 1921, for sickness and accident
benefits in 1939, and for health plans in 1942.60
In 1929, 5% of large firms provided profit sharing plans, 15%
provided health and accident insurance, and 2% provided a group
pension plan.6' In the same year, Blue Cross created its first medical
insurance plan providing for prepaid medical costs at a Dallas, Texas,
hospital. 62 The Great Depression that soon followed, however, was a
turbulent time in employee benefits. Many employer-sponsored benefit
programs were discontinued or became insolvent; at the same time,
economic and social legislation encouraged other companies to start or
reinstate welfare benefits.63
Employee benefits became more prevalent after the 1942 passage
of the Wage Stabilization Act, 64 which froze pay levels to control
inflation and boost production of war materials. A concurrent increase
in union activity caused a resurgent interest in benefits, and unions
played a role in convincing the War Labor Board to permit increases in
"fringe" benefits, although wages were frozen. 66 Consequently, the
provision of benefits increased dramatically in order to mitigate the
effects of the wage freeze and "[t]he number of firms providing these
benefits doubled from 1940 to 1946. ",67 Unions continued to play an
important role in promoting employer-sponsored benefits after the war.
57.

T. MILKOVICH & JENNIFER STEVENS, BACK TO THE FUTURE: A CENTURY OF
I I (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Sch. of Indus. & Labor Relations,
Cornell
Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
99-08,
1999),
available
at
http://www.ilr.comell.edu/depts/CAHRS/.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Idat 12.
60. EBRI, supra note 54, at 5.
61. MILKOVICH & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 12.
62. Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community-Based Health Care: A Legal and Policy
Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 237 (1996).
63. MILKOVICH & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 12.
64. Wage Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 576, 56 Stat. 765.
65. MILKOVICH & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 15.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id.
GEORGE

COMPENSATION
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A 1949 court decision solidified benefits' role in total compensation,
declaring that fringe benefits were a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining."
The next revolution in employee benefits occurred in the 19 70's.
Firms again expanded benefit offerings in efforts to get around the
wage-price controls imposed by the Nixon administration in the early
part of that decade.6 9 In 1974, Congress passed a law to regulate the
expanding employee pension and welfare plans, known as the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 7o ERISA established
standards with which employee benefit plans must comply in order to
maintain their tax-favored status, such as standards for reporting and
disclosure, funding, fiscal responsibility, and employee eligibility and
vesting.1
It was also in 1974 that employee benefit plans first introduced the
element of choice. TRW implemented the country's first flexible or
"cafeteria-style" benefits program,72 which included three medical plans,
eight life insurance plans, dependent life insurance, and supplemental
death and dismemberment benefits.73 In response to this private
innovation, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1978, 74 which permitted
the choice between taxable and non-taxable forms of compensation and
lessened the burden for companies that wanted to offer flexible
benefits. 75 Following these and other tax law changes, the adoption of
flexible benefit plans increased .76 In addition to creating tax preferences
for cafeteria-style benefits, the 1978 Revenue Act created the 401(k)
defined contribution retirement savings plan.77
Sometime in the mid-1980's, the term "fringe" was dropped and
benefits were considered part of a total compensation package. 78 By

68. Id. (referring to Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1949) (stating that
pension plans are an appropriate.subject for collective bargaining)).
69. WHrrMAN, supra note 25, at 174-75.
70. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C. (2001)). Title II of ERISA of 1974 amended scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2001).
71. Paul Yakoboski, Overview of the U.S. Employment-Based Retirement Income System,
EBRI-ERF POLICY FORUM, Dec. 1, 1999, at 1.
72. MILKOVICH & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 20.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
75. MILKOVICH & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 17.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 12.
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1995, benefits costs came to comprise 28% of total compensation. 79
Today, roughly half of the private sector workforce is covered by an
employer-sponsored pension plan," and 62% of the civilian population
under age sixty-five is covered by employment-based health insurance.8
Naturally, employee benefit programs are not limited to income
security and health insurance. Benefit programs help provide access to a
wide range of services, including ongoing education and training,
childcare, long-term care, and legal assistance.82 Other benefits provide
convenience and cost savings for employees, such as subsidized parking,
product discounts, and relocation expense reimbursement.83 While these
secondary benefits likely affect employee mobility and job lock, the
focus of the ensuing discussion is on employer-based pension and health
insurance benefits.
PART II: ARE BENEFITS BECOMING MORE PORTABLE?
This section of the article examines the changes that employee
benefit plans have undergone in recent decades and explores whether
benefit portability has been on the rise. The focus is on the passage of
portability-enabling legislation and on changes in the offerings of
voluntary employer-sponsored benefits.
A. PensionPortability
One of the assumptions behind security systems in the United
States is that individuals can neither manage life risks nor save enough
money for retirement.84 The development of the modem retirement
security system occurred after the Great Depression proved that thrift
and good work were insufficient to provide security in a capitalist
economy.85 The American retirement security system was designed to

79. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE 21st
CENTURY 14 (1999) [hereinafter FUTUREWORK].
80. Id. at 15.
81. JENNIFER A. CAMPBELL, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (1999).
82. EBRI, supra note 54, at 5.
83. Id.
84. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE SECURITY, EBRI
NOTES 1 (1996) [hereinafter EBRI NOTES 1996].
85. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/3

10

Ulrich: You Can't Take it with You: An Examination of Employee Benefit Po
2001]

You Can't Take It With You

split the job of managing risk and increasing retirement savings among
government, employers, and individuals.86
The resulting system is said to resemble a three-legged stool.87 The
first leg of the stool is Social Security, a government-provided social
insurance system. Social Security is funded by payroll taxes, and the
system operates by transferring payments from current workers to
current recipients, with limited reserves to cover fluctuations in the
number of workers or recipients. Benefits are universal and distributed
via formulas designed to be adequate to prevent poverty. 9 Cost-of-living
adjustments keep these payments in step with inflation. 9'
The second leg of the retirement security stool is a system of
voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans.92 Employers are
encouraged to provide benefits for employees with tax deductions that
are afforded to nondiscriminatory or "qualified" plans. 93 Contributions to
a "qualified" plan are immediately deductible from the employer's
taxes,94 and "are generally not treated as wages subject to Social Security
(FICA) and unemployment (FUTA) taxes." 95 Contributions and
investment returns become taxable to employees only at the time of
subsequent distribution from the plan, which allows benefits to accrue
more quickly over the employee's lifetime.96
97
The third leg of the retirement stool consists of individual savings,
which are generally unregulated and handled on an after-tax basis. To
complement these individual savings, Congress has developed a
regulated system of Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs).98 These
arrangements allow certain individuals to make contributions (or in
some cases only to earn interest on contributions) on a tax-deferred

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
EBRI NOTES 1996, supra note 84, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 55.
95. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 270
(2000) (citing I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)(5),(v)(1); 3306(b)(5),(r)(l)). "However, this exemption from
employment taxes does not apply to elective deferrals under such plans." Id.
96. EBRI, supra note 54, at 55.
97. EBRI NOTES 1996, supra note 84, at 1.
98. EBRI, supra note 54, at 163.
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basis. 99 This third leg of the stool is "not precise,", but is "expected to

exist for most workers."'' °
Employees tend to rely heavily on employer-sponsored retirement
plans. One reason is the generous tax treatment granted to qualified
employer plans. Whereas individuals can contribute only $3000 annually
to an IRA,'°' employees may save up to $11,000 per year in an
employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, 1 2 and employers may contribute up to
$40,000 per year'°3 (less employee elective contributions) in tax-deferred

compensation. Employees who receive benefits under defined benefit
retirement plans may receive up to $160,000 per year,'" or 100% of the
participant's average compensation for his or her high-three-years'

salary. '°5 By granting greater tax advantages to employer-sponsored
plans than to individual plans, the government has provided incentive
both for employers06 to establish such plans and for employees to

participate in them.

1. Employer-Sponsored Pension Basics
While pension plans are complicated and come in numerous
designs, there are a few basic principles of plan design that are important
to the following portability discussion. Specifically, it is important to
understand the difference between defined contribution and defined

99. Id.
100. EBRI NOTES 1996, supra note 84, at 1.
101. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001). The maximum amount is $3000 for the years 2002 through 2004; $4000 for the
years 2005 through 2007; $5000 for the years 2008 and thereafter, with future indexing for inflation.
Id. Employees age fifty and older may also make "catch-up" contributions of $500 for the years
2002 through 2005, and "catch-up" contributions of $1000 for the years 2006 and thereafter, with
future indexing for inflation. id.
102. Id. Employees may save the following amounts for the specified years: 2003 - $12,000;
2004 - $13,000; 2005 - $14,000; 2006 - $15,000, and thereafter indexed to inflation. Id. at § 611.
Employees age fifty and older may also make "catch-up" contributions of the following amounts:
2002 - $500; 2003 - $1000; 2004 - $1500; 2005 - $2000; 2006 - $2500, and thereafter indexed to
inflation. Id. at
103. Id.
104. I.R.C. § 415(b)(l)(A) (2001); see also EBRI, supra note 54, at 57-58 (stating that these
dollar limits are imposed by I.R.C. § 415 and are indexed to inflation by adjusting for changes in the
Consumer Price Index).
105. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) (2001). The $160,000 limit comes from I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) and is
often referred to as the DB "dollar limitation," while the percentage limitation comes from I.R.C. §
415(b)(l)(B) and is often called the DB "percentage of compensation limitation" or the DB
"compensation limitation."
106. EBRI, supra note 54, at 55.
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benefit plans, and the types of vesting requirements that employers may
impose. A brief description of these characteristics follows.
a. Defined Contribution Versus Defined Benefit Plans
There are two fundamental types of pension plans: defined benefit
and defined contribution. A defined benefit plan promises a specified
monthly benefit at retirement. The plan may state the promised benefit
as an exact dollar amount, such as $100 per month at retirement, but
plans more commonly calculate benefits through a plan formula.' 7 Plan
formulas typically consider such factors as salary and service-for
example, 1% of the employee's average salary, during the last five years
of employment, for every year of service with the employer."8
Reflecting employers' desires to retain workers who have acquired
valuable skills, employers often design defined benefit plan formulas to
be "back loaded."'' 9 As such, employers often provide disproportionately
more generous benefits to workers following traditional patternsspending many years with a single company and retiring at a specified
time-than to workers following other career patterns." Defined benefit
pensions also reflect the traditional view that investment management
and financial risk are better handled by employers than by workers."' In
defined benefit plans, the employer alone bears the investment risk."2 If
the pension fund's investments do poorly, the employer is liable for the
shortfall and must bring the fund up to the promised benefit level. "'
A defined contribution plan, in contrast, does not promise a specific
amount of benefits at retirement. In these plans, the employee, the
1
employer, or both, contribute to an individual account under the plan.'
Contributions may be variable or at a set rate, such as 5% of earnings
annually." 5 Contributions are then invested and the employee ultimately
receives the account balance, which is based on contributions and

107.

PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CASH BALANCE PLANS
& A],
at
Q
BALANCE
CASH
[hereinafter
(1999)
& ANSWERS

QUESTIONS

http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/pubs/chashbq&a.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
108. Id.
109. FUTUREWORK, supra note 79, at 16.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Steven L. Willborn, The Problem with Pension Portability, 77 NEB. L. REV. 344, 347
(1998).
113. Id.
114. CASH BALANCE Q & A, supra note 107.
115. Id.
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investment gains or losses." 6 Thus, employees in defined contribution
plans bear the investment risk-if the investment experience is poor, the
amounts received at retirement will go down; if the investment
experience is good, employees will receive more in retirement than
initially expected. "7
Defined contribution pensions are said to reflect an employer's
desire to limit long-term financial exposure,'18 and a shift in employers'
priorities away from retaining workers with eroding industrial skills to
attracting new workers with up-to-the-minute skills.',9 Defined
contribution arrangements tend to attract mobile workers because they
are more adaptable to the needs of workers who change jobs or follow
varied career paths.'2 ° Small employers favor defined contribution plans
to avoid the financial commitment and administrative complexities
associated with a defined benefit plan. 2' Defined contribution plans
come in numerous designs. Examples of defined contribution plans
include 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, money purchase plans, employee
stock ownership plans, deferred profit-sharing plans, Simplified
Employee Pensions plans (SEPs), savings and thrift plans, and
Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs). '
b. Vesting Requirements
Participants in qualified retirement plans generally attain nonrevocable or "vested" rights to keep the employer's contributions after
satisfying a firm's specified service requirements. ' While an
employee's own contributions to an employer-sponsored plan vest
immediately, employers may impose a vesting period on any benefits
that they contribute to the plan on the employee's behalf.'24 Plan
sponsors are not obligated to impose any vesting requirements, but if
they do, ERISA places restrictions on the maximum amount, of service
that may be required. ERISA offers plan sponsors the choice of two
different vesting schedules. The first option is cliff vesting, in which no
benefits are vested until three years of service are attained, but 100% of
116. Id.
117. Willborn, supra note 112, at 347.
118.

FUTUREWORK, supra note 79, at 16.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
CASH BALANCEQ & A, supra note 107.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 42.
Id. at 43.
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benefits become vested when the employee meets the service
requirement.' 25 The second option is graded vesting, where employees
earn 20% of the benefit after three years of service, and an additional
20% for each subsequent year of service, until 100% of the benefit is
vested at the end of the seventh year.126 Employers are free to impose
lesser vesting requirements, but cannot require more than these
maximum service provisions.
2. Legislative Efforts to Increase Pension Portability
Pension portability has been an important issue for the federal
government since the 1960's.127 The last several decades have seen
numerous actions by Congress that have increased employee benefit
portability. This section discusses several of those legal changes,
including changes in vesting and rollover rules. It also discusses the
creation of new retirement plans, such as the 401(k), the Savings
Incentive Match Plan for Employees (SIMPLE), and Individual
Retirement Arrangements (IRAs).
a. Vesting
With the passage of ERISA, Congress established the' first
minimum vesting rules for retirement plans in 1974. Before that time,28
approximately 40% of pension plans had no vesting provisions at all,1
which meant that most employees entirely forfeited pensions at job
change. Legislative and regulatory changes during the 1980s and 1990s
increased vesting rates by shortening the duration of service that a
company can require before an individual's pension rights vest.2 9 The
Tax Reform Act of 1986, l"' for example, amended ERISA to establish
faster vesting schedules.'"' Further vesting changes went into effect on
January 1, 1999, when the maximum vesting requirement for multiemployer pension plans was reduced from ten-year cliff vesting to the

125. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001).I.R.C. § 411 (a)(2)(A)
126. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B) (2001). There is a separate vesting schedule for
employer matching contributions. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
127. WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 176.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
131. Yakoboski, supra note 71, at 16.
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same vesting rules associated with other qualified plans.' With the
implementation of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, additional, faster vesting changes went into effect for
employer matching contributions to a 401(k) plan. For matching
contributions, vesting now must occur either: (1) 100% after three years
of service; or, (2) 20% after two years of service, and an additional 20%
for each
year of service thereafter, with the total amount vesting after six
33
years.

b. The 401(k) Plan
The Revenue Act of 1978134 amended the Internal Revenue Code,
adding to it § 401(k).' 35 This section provided for a new type of pension,
commonly referred to as the "401(k)" plan, which is a popular retirement
savings vehicle.' 36 Employers prefer these arrangements because they37
offer some flexibility in pension plan design and contribution levels.'
Employees like these arrangements because income taxation on plan
contributions and investment returns is deferred until the time of
withdrawal, which is presumed to be a time when the
employees'
3
income, and thus their marginal tax rate, might be lower. 1
There are several ways in which contributions can be made to these
retirement accounts. Section 401(k) arrangements can be designed to
accept contributions through salary reduction, through profit-sharing
distributions, or a combination of both methods. 3 9 In a salary reduction
arrangement, employees are given the option to contribute a portion of
their income to a qualified retirement plan via pre-tax deductions in
salary, which the employer then pays into the plan on behalf of the
employees.' 40 By electing to have a percentage of salary contributed to
the plan, employees reduce their salary and the base on which current
federal income (and some state taxes) are calculated.' 4' These
arrangements can be designed to include employee contributions only,

132.
133.
Stat. 38
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.at 3.
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
(2001).
Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
EBRI, supra note 54, at 93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 93.
Id. at 94.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/3

16

Ulrich: You Can't Take it with You: An Examination of Employee Benefit Po

20011

You Can't Take It With You

employer contributions only, or both employee and employer
contributions. 41 In cash or deferred profit sharing arrangements,
employees are offered the option of deferring a profit sharing
distribution, or some portion of it, to the trust account or taking the
distribution in cash. 143 In both arrangements, the deferral, and any
tax-free until distribution.'" Distributions taken
income thereon, accrues
45
in cash are taxed.'
Like other qualified retirement plans, sponsors of 401(k)
arrangements must ensure that the plan does not discriminate in favor of
highly compensated employees in terms of coverage, participation in the
plan, or contributions provided.'4 6 While the rules governing coverage
and participation are identical to those for other qualified retirement
plans, 401(k)s have a special test for ensuring non-discrimination in
contributions and benefits. 47' This test, known as the Actual Deferral
compensated
Percentage Test, limits elective contributions of highly
4
1
employees, and employers must run the test annually.'
Section 401(k) arrangements appear to be gaining popularity with
each passing year, perhaps because many employers do not mind
sponsoring a retirement plan as long as the employees, rather than the
employer, fund the plan's benefits.'4 9 The percentage of employees
whose employer sponsored a 401(k) plan increased from 27% in 1988 to
37% in 1993.'" 0 Those numbers continued to increase in the late 1990's,
with 55% of full-time employees in medium and large establishments' 5'
participating in such plans by 1997.' 52

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. EBRI, supra note 54, at 94.
146. Id. at 96.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Richard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE-Yet Another Tax-Favored Retirement Plan,
32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 401,406-07 (1998).
150. WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 176-77.
151. Medium to large establishments are those establishments with one hundred or more
employees.
152. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM
AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS (1997), at http://stats.bls.gov/ebshome.htm [hereinafter
BENEFITS 1997]. These numbers are not as high for small establishments with under one hundred
employees, however, as only three out of ten employees of these establishments participate in such
plans. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMALL
PRIVATE

INDUSTRY

ESTABLISHMENTS

(1996), at http://stats.bls.gov/ebshome.htm

[hereinafter

BENEFITS 1996].
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c. Rollovers
Legislative efforts to enhance retirement portability have typically
focused on making it easier for participants to transfer money between
retirement accounts, especially between defined contribution accounts.
In 1992 and 2001, Congress relaxed the rollover rules to clarify and
expand the situations in which distributions from qualified plans could
be rolled over into other retirement accounts, including Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), without subjecting the worker to current
taxation and penalties. 53' For example, the 2001 changes stipulate that
distributions from qualified retirement plans may be rolled into any
other qualified plan or into an IRA; these changes allow, for the first
time, rollovers between different types of non-IRA plans, such as
between a 401(k) and a non-profit employer's § 403(b) plan. 54 Further,
the changes provide that after-tax contributions may be rolled over to an
IRA or a qualified plan. 55 The changes also provide that distributions
from an IRA, into which a taxpayer has made deductible contributions,
56
may be rolled over into a qualified workplace retirement plan.'
There are a number of reasons why participants may be interested
in rolling over assets, held on their behalf, by a former employer, to their
new employer. For example, the participant may think that the new
employer's fund is more stable or has better investment advisors, the
transfer may permit the participant to buy years of service credit in the
new plan, or the transfer may simply make it easier for the participant to
keep track of his or her money."'
d. SIMPLE
In order to generate incentives for the creation of employersponsored plans, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996' 8
created a simplified retirement plan for small businesses.5 9 Called the
Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees (SIMPLE), only those
employers with less than one hundred employees, who do not maintain
153. Willbom, supra note 112, at 349 n.12 (citation omitted); see also Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
154. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Willbom, supra note 112, at 348-49.
158. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 408(p) (2001)).
159. EBRI, supra note 54, at 485.
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another retirement plan, are eligible to participate." To ease
administration, contributions made through this type of plan may be
made to either an IRA or a 401(k) account. 6 ' Under this plan, the
employee may contribute up to $7000 in 2002, increasing by $1000
increments to $10,000 in 2005.62 Employers have two contribution
options to choose from. Employers may either provide a 3% match on
employee contributions (i.e., employees making voluntary contributions
receive a dollar-for-dollar match for the first 3% of income they save),
or they may contribute 2% of each employee's pay regardless of whether
the employee made elective contributions. 63 The main advantages of the
SIMPLE plan include simplified reporting requirements and a waiver of
the complicated non-discrimination requirements applicable to other
qualified plans. 6 4
e. IRA Expansion
Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), originally established
by Congress as part of ERISA in 1974, have undergone many changes
since their creation.' 65 These arrangements were originally instituted as a
vehicle to provide workers without employment-based pensions an
opportunity. to save for retirement on a tax-deferred basis. 166 Subsequent
legislation has changed, and generally expanded, eligibility to participate
in these arrangements. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA)'67 extended the availability of IRAs .to all workers, including
those with pension coverage. 66 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
'86) 169took a step backwards, retaining tax-deductible IRAs for families
in which neither spouse was covered by an employment-based pension,
but restricting tax deductibility for those with pension coverage to
families with incomes below specified levels. 70 To accommodate the
new limitations, the Act added two new categories of IRA contributions:

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001).
163. EBRI, supra note 54, at 485
164. Id.
165. Id. at 163.
166. Id.
167. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
168. EBRI, supra note 54, at 163.
169. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
170. EBRI, supra note 54, at 163.
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nondeductible contributions that accumulate tax-free until distributed,
and partially deductible contributions. 7 ' Although the 1986 Act made
IRAs less advantageous for some individuals, most individuals
may still
72
contribute the maximum amount on a tax-deductible basis.
Congress expanded the purview of the IRA with the passage of the
73
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).'
One of the most controversial features of HIPAA was the creation of the
Medical Savings Account (MSA) program. 74 The MSA, commonly
referred to as a "medical IRA," "is a savings program for financing
health care expenses that is designed to supplement traditional indemnity
and medical insurance programs.""'7 Unlike traditional IRAs, the use of
tax-preferred MSA funds is not limited to retirement savings purposes,116
and account holders may use their savings without penalty for either
retirement savings or current medical expenses. "7 The MSA permits
funds not used for medical expenses in the current tax year to
accumulate tax-free for use in future years, effectively enabling account
holders to use their MSAs as tax-preferred retirement savings vehicles.1
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 199779 established another type of IRA,
referred to as the "Roth IRA," named after its principal sponsor, Senator
William Roth (R-Md.) ° In contrast to the traditional IRA, where
"contributions are deductible but withdrawals on retirement are
taxable,"' 8 ' Roth IRA "contributions are not deductible, but withdrawals
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (2001)).
174. Regina T. Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Healthy, Wealthy &
Wise, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 685, 687 (1999).
175. Id. at 687-88.
176. I.R.C. § 220(f)(4)(C) (2001) (providing that any distributions made after an account
holder reaches age sixty-five are not subject to the 15% excise penalty that typically applies to
distributions used for purposes other than qualified medical expenses); see also Benjamin C. Ayers
& Elizabeth Plummer, New MSA and Health Insurance Rules Create Opportunities, 58 TAX'N FOR
ACCT. 260, 263 (1997) (suggesting that Congress authorized, perhaps unintentionally, the use of
MSAs as an alternative means of securing retirement savings).
177. Ayers & Plummer, supra note 176, at 260-61 (explaining that because MSAs allow the
taxpayer to accumulate unused funds, they closely resemble IRAs). With IRAs, there is a 10%
penalty for distributions taken prior to age sixty-five. I.R.C. § 72(t)(1) (2001). There is an exception
to the penalty, however, if the distribution is used for medical expenses or health insurance
premiums for unemployed individuals, to the extent that they exceed the amount designated by
I.R.C. § 213(d)(l)(D). I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2)(B), (D) (2001).
178. Jefferson, supra note 173, at 688.
179. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111Stat. 788 (1997).
180. Jefferson, supra note 173, at 699 n.84.
181. Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 219(a), 408(d) (2001)).
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on retirement are tax exempt."' 82 Like the traditional IRA, the maximum
amount that individuals may contribute is limited to $3000 annually.'83
"[W]hen a taxpayer's marginal tax rate remains constant, the traditional
and Roth IRA provide identical benefits.' 84
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
further affected the IRA by allowing employers to permit voluntary
employee contributions to deemed traditional IRA accounts and deemed
Roth IRA accounts under qualified plans.'85 It also enacted a "catch-up"
provision for individuals age fifty or over, permitting them to make an
additional annual contribution of $500 in 2002 through 2005, and an
additional annual contribution of $1000 each year thereafter.'86
3. Employer Efforts to Increase Pension Portability
At the same time Congress has been trying to increase portability
via legislation, employers have been making innovations in pension plan
design that have also resulted in increased portability. The most
influential change has been the shift away from defined benefit plans
toward more portable defined contribution plans and similar hybrids.
a. The Move from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution
From the time of its inception and into the 1980's, the American
"pension system
was dominated by...
'defined
benefit'
'
7
8
arrangements."' Defined contribution pensions began to challenge this
leading role in the 1980's, however, and today they dominate the
retirement scene.'88 When measured in terms of participants in private
sector qualified plans, the percentage of participants in defined
contribution plans increased from 26% to 55% between 1975 and
1995.89 During that same period, the count of defined contribution plans
as a percentage of all qualified plans increased from 67% to 90%.9 ° One

182.
183.
Stat. 38
184.
185.
Stat. 38
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 408A(c)(1), (d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998)).
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
(2001).
Jefferson, supra note 173, at 699 n.84 (citing I.R.C. § 408A(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998)).
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
(2001).
Id.
FUTUREWORK, supra note 79, at 16.
Id. at 16, 18.
Yakoboski, supra note 71, at 9.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:173

scholar proclaimed that this shift on the part of employers from defined
benefit to defined contribution arrangements "has done the most" to
enhance portability of pension plans.' 9'
There are several reasons why the move to defined contribution
plans has increased benefit portability. First, "[v]esting provisions in
these plans are generally more liberal than those for defined benefit
plans."'92 The employee contributions vest immediately, and "[m]any
defined contribution plans provide at least partial vesting of employer
contribution after two or three years of service. '' '93 Defined benefit plans,
in contrast, often adopt a cliff vesting rule.' 94 Second, defined
contribution plans typically pay benefits in a lump sum at the time of
employment termination, whereas defined benefit plans typically pay
benefits as an annuity that is not distributed until the employee reaches
retirement age. '9' Third, since defined contribution plans can be rolled
over into another investment account, they continue to accrue value over
the employee's lifetime, whereas defined benefit plans typically freeze
the benefit amount at termination, leaving the employee exposed to
future inflation.'9 6 Fourth, defined contribution plans create a steady
stream of benefits to an employee regardless of service. Under defined
benefit plans, the size of the pension benefit generally "rises
disproportionately to the number of years of service, creating a premium
or reward for longevity with a single employer.' ' 97 This back-loaded

defined benefit design has the effect of discouraging older employees
from changing employers.
b. Hybrid Plans
Even those employers who still choose to provide a defined benefit
plan have been adopting plans with more portability-enhancing
characteristics. An increasing number of employers have been offering
these hybrid retirement plans, which combine features of both defined
benefit and defined contribution plans.' 98 While there are a variety of

191.

192.
193.
schedule
194.
195.
196.
197.

WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 176.

EBRI, supra note 54, at 74.
Id. at 74-75. As of January 1, 2002, employer matching contributions must vest on a faster
than for defined benefit plans. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 75; see also Section H.A. .b for explanation of cliff vesting.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 75.
Id.
WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 176.

198. EBRI, supra note 54, at I11.
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these plans in existence,'99 this section addresses only the best known of
these designs: the cash balance plan.2°°
The cash balance plan first became well-known in the mid-1980s,
when Bank of America adopted such a plan with the goal of combining
the best features of both defined benefit and defined contribution
designs. 20 ' The outward characteristics of cash balance plans closely
resemble a defined contribution plan, and capture portability as an
advantage of the plan design. 23 Like a defined contribution plan, each
participant has an account that is credited annually with a dollar amount
resembling an employer contribution, typically expressed as a
percentage of pay.204 Likewise, each participant's account is also credited
annually with interest.205 The option to receive benefits in the form of a
lump-sum is another shared characteristic, and these lump-sum
distributions are popular with participants, because they can be rolled
over into an IRA or another employer's retirement plan. 206 Because the
benefit accrual of a cash balance plan also follows the defined
contribution pattern, these plans are attractive to younger, shorter-service
employees who can accrue benefits more quickly and who find the
account concept attractive.2 7
Despite the apparent similarities to defined contribution plans,
20 8
however, cash balance plans are actually defined benefit arrangements.
The plan has an account-based nature, but plan assets are not specifically
allocated to participant accounts. 2°9 There are no actual employee
accounts; instead, a participant's benefit is based on a hypothetical
account used as a bookkeeping device."0 Employers contribute to the
plan generally, based on actuarial valuations, and contributions may
actually be less than the sum of the additions to participants' accounts.'i
The individual account balances are credited with hypothetical
199.
weighted
200.
201.
202.
203.

Other hybrid plan designs include the pension equity, life cycle, floor-offset, ageprofit-sharing, new comparability profit-sharing, and target benefit plans. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Elizabeth E. Drigotas, Cash Balance Plans: An Overview, 28 TAX MGMT.
COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 39, 40-41 (2000).
204. EBRI, supra note 54, at 111.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 111,114.
207. Id. at 116.
208. Id. at 112.
209. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 40.
210. Id. at 39.
211. EBRI, supra note 54, at 112.
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contribution and interest credits, 2' 2 but that interest is not tied to actual
plan investment earnings over the period.2 3 The interest component is
defined in the plan either as a specified rate or a rate related to some
index (such as the consumer price index or the rate on U.S. Treasury
bills) and is completely unrelated to the actual investment earnings of
the pension trust.21
Although the design is not new, cash balance plans have received a
great deal of, attention recently due, in part, to an increase in the number
of employers who are converting their traditional defined benefit plans
into cash balance plans.2"5 Despite the recent attention, hybrid plans
remain relatively rare. In 1998, only 4% of employers with two hundred
or more employees sponsored a cash balance plan. 2 6
B. Health InsurancePortability
The majority of Americans under age sixty-five are covered by
employer-provided health insurance, and one result of this link between
employment and health insurance is that insurance is not portable across
jobs. 27 A U.S. Census Bureau report revealed that roughly 44% of
workers with a job interruption experienced one or more months without
health insurance due to that interruption.2 8 One of the major concerns
listed in that report was the length of time that Americans remain
without coverage after losing it-a median period of 5.3 months.2 9
Most job lock studies have focused on the effect of employerprovided health insurance. Thirty percent of respondents to a 1991 New
York Times/CBS News poll and 20% of respondents to a June 1991
Gallup poll cited the risk of losing health insurance benefits as an
important reason for remaining at a job.220 Similarly, in the 1998 Health
Confidence Survey, 27% of Americans "reported that they or an

212. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 39.
213. Id. at 40.
214. EBRI, supra note 54, at 112.
215. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 39.
216. Yakoboski, supra note 71, at 11.
217. Kapur, supra note 40, at 282.
218. ROBERT L. BENNEFIELD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:
HEALTH INSURANCE, 1993 TO 1995; WHO LOSES COVERAGE AND FOR How LONG?, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hi94asc.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
219. Id.
220. Monheit & Cooper, supra note 44, at 68.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/3

24

Ulrich: You Can't Take it with You: An Examination of Employee Benefit Po
2001]

2You Can't Take It With You

22
immediate family member had experienced some form of job lock. '
As such, improving health insurance portability may play a key role in
supporting the terms of the new psychological contract.

1. Health Insurance Basics
Like the three-legged stool concept in retirement security, health
insurance can be provided by the government, by employers, or by the
individual. Unlike the retirement system, however, these three possible
sources of coverage tend to be mutually exclusive, and individuals rarely
obtain coverage from more than one source.222 Another difference from
the retirement system is that there is no universal governmental health
insurance coverage. As of 1998, 24.3% of individuals had a form of
government insurance, 23 62% of individuals obtained health insurance
from an employer-sponsored plan, and 8.2% of individuals had an
individually purchased health insurance plan.224 Approximately 16.3% of
individuals had no health insurance at all.225
a. Health Insurance Plan Types
Employer-sponsored health insurance plans, the dominant source of
health insurance coverage, can be divided into two primary types of
coverage. 226 The first type, the pre-paid plan, allows individuals to pay
periodic fees in exchange for the provision of services at the time they
are needed.2 An example of a pre-paid plan is a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO).22 8 "HMOs both finance and deliver health care
services, 229 and "[e]ach HMO develops its own rates and benefits. 230
"HMOs' basic functions are to provide comprehensive health care
services to subscribers, contract with or employ.., health care
professionals who will provide the covered medical services, and
221.

PAUL

FRONSTIN,

EMPLOYEE

BENEFIT

RESEARCH

INST.,

HEALTH

INSURANCE

1998 HEALTH CONFIDENCE SURVEY, EBRI
NOTES 6 (Aug. 1998) [hereinafter EBRI NOTES Aug. 1998] (footnote omitted).
222. There are some exceptions to this concept. For example, 7.6% of Medicare recipients also
have private insurance coverage. CAMPBELL, supra note 81 at 2.
223. Medicare, Medicaid, or military health care program.
224. CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 1.
225. Id.
226. EBRI, supra note 54, at 211.
227. Id. at 235-36.
228. Id. at211.
229. Id. at 235.
230. Id. at 236.
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contract with one or more hospitals to provide covered hospital
care ... ,,23 HMO participants are therefore limited in their choice of
doctors to those who contract with the HMO as part of its network. This
may serve as a disincentive to mobility since changing jobs may mean
switching HMOs and, therefore, switching doctors.
The second type of plan is the traditional fee-for-service indemnity
232
plan. In this arrangement, insured individuals are reimbursed (for
covered charges they incur) after a service has been provided.233 Unlike
HMOs, which contract directly with health care professionals, fee-forservice plans do not impose restrictions on insured individuals' choice of
physicians. Fee-for-service plans may be better suited than HMOs to the
needs of mobile employees, since changing plans does not also require a
change in physicians.
A hybrid arrangement has also emerged in the health insurance
scene, known as the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). PPOs "are
not actually organizations but rather are contractual arrangements,
generally between health care providers and an employer or insurance
234
company, to provide fee-for-service health care, usually at a discount.,
Under PPO arrangements, health care providers agree to pre-negotiated
rates for those with whom they have contracted for service; in return
these providers enjoy an increased pool of patients and/or faster claims
processing."' In most cases, PPO members may choose any health care
provider they wish.236 However, the PPO arrangement uses financial
incentives, such as expanded benefits or lower costs, to induce
individuals to use preferred providers. 237 The mobile employee would
therefore be able to continue seeing his own doctor if changing plans,
but may have financial incentive to switch.
b. Health Insurance Plan Operators
Employer-sponsored health plans not only differ according to the
type of fee arrangement, but they are generally furnished by one of three
types of plan operators: commercial insurance plans, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans, or self-insured plans.238
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

EBRI, supra note 54, at 236.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 243.
Id.
EBRI, supra note 54, at 245.

Id.
Id. at 212.
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The first type of operator, the commercial insurance company, is a
major source of health insurance.239 Insurance companies generally
charge premiums that are calculated to cover the benefits paid,
administrative costs, sales commissions, state premium taxes, and
profit. '40
The second type of operator, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan,
is a group of localized non-profit plans that operate independently but
comply with standards set by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Administration. 4 ' Because each plan is independent, they vary by
geographic region in terms of benefit structures. 242
The third type of operator is the self-insured plan, whereby "the
employer essentially acts as its own insurance company and bears the
financial risk of making payments to providers. 243 Some employers both
self-insure and self-administer their plans, while others purchase
administrative services. 244 Employers' who self-insure are exempt from
any state-mandated-coverage.24 As such, self-insured plans may have
distinctive design features not otherwise available in the market, and
each of these plans may be unique.
c. Federal Health Insurance Regulation
Title I of ERISA is the statute primarily responsible for regulating
health care coverage through its monitoring of employment-based health
plans.246 Its requirements for private health plans were initially limited to
select areas, such as informational disclosures, fiduciary conduct, and
remedies for plan participants, and did not establish substantive federal
requirements for private health plan coverage and benefits. 24 7 This. lack
of regulation has resulted in insurance offerings varying widely across
employers, with some employers designing medical plans specifically
for their own employee populations. As a result, portability of plans
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. EBRI, supra note 54, at 212.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 38.
246. Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the
Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 486 (1997); see also Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.
(2001)). Title II of ERISA of 1974 amended scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C.
§§ 1-9833 (2001).
247. Id. at 488.
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across employers is often impossible. Several amendments to ERISA,
however, have been aimed at addressing this problem. A discussion of
these laws follows.
2. Legislative Efforts to Increase Health Insurance Portability
Congress enacted two major laws intended to increase health
insurance portability, the first known as the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985248 (COBRA), and the more recent
known as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA).249 COBRA focused on addressing one cause of job
lock-the lack of health insurance coverage during an unemployed job
search or an eligibility waiting period with a new employer. The source
of job lock that attracted legislators' attention in HIPAA is the "preexisting" health condition exclusion, which often made it difficult for
workers with personal or family health problems to get complete health
insurance coverage upon job change.250 The impact of these laws is
explored in the following section.
a. COBRA
Until 1985, ERISA's provisions relating to health care plans were
merely procedural. Congress enacted the first substantive federal
requirements for private health care plans by amending ERISA as part of
COBRA. 25' The Act's goal was to relieve the hardships that employees
and their families experience as a result of the temporary loss of group
health insurance. 2522 The purpose was to ensure continuous coverage
during transitional periods for individuals changing from one job to
another, and, therefore, from one health insurance plan to another.253
COBRA, as amended in legislation subsequent to its passage in
1985, requires employers with health insurance plans to offer qualified
beneficiaries continued access to group health insurance if they lose
coverage as a result of a qualifying event.254 Plan sponsors must offer
248. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 227 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2001)).
249. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (2001)).
250. Kapur, supra note 40, at 282.
251. Medill, supra note 246, at 494.
252. FronstinStatement, supra note 41, at 40.
253. Rebecca Lewin, Comment, Job lock: Will HIPAA Solve the Job Mobility Problem?, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 507, 517 (2000).
254. FronstinStatement, supra note 41, at 40.
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continued insurance access for eighteen months to employees, spouses,
and dependent children who lose coverage after a covered employee
loses benefits due to termination of employment or a reduction in work
hours 255
.
COBRA is touted as an Act that improves health insurance
portability and reduces job lock.256 One reason for this is that COBRA
allows continuation of the same health insurance policy that an
employee had in place at work.257 COBRA specifies that the quality of
the coverage must be "identical to the coverage provided under the plan
to similarly situated beneficiaries under the plan with respect to whom a
qualifying event has not occurred.2 58 COBRA coverage is advantageous
for most workers, because although an employee can be required to pay
102% of the applicable premium,25 9 workers can still realize significant
savings compared with purchasing the equivalent health insurance policy
in the private market.26 COBRA premiums are typically lower than
those for plans purchased directly from an insurance company because
the employer plan enjoys administrative economies of scale and a
reduced risk of adverse selection.2 6' Furthermore, employment-based
plans typically cover a larger array of benefits than individually
purchased plans for an equivalent premium, so the COBRA participant
tends to get more for each insurance dollar.262
COBRA's most significant contribution to alleviating job lock may
be that it allows employees to continue coverage under one plan while
simultaneously enrolling under another, thus "allow[ing] employees to
retain coverage while riding out exclusion periods imposed by the new
plan.,,263 Thus, COBRA acts as a "safety valve," eliminating some of the
gaps in coverage that would otherwise result from changing jobs.2 6

255. Id.
256. Id. at 41.
257. Id. at 40.
258. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(l)(2001).
259. "Under COBRA, the 'applicable premium' generally equals 'the cost to the plan ... for
similarly situated beneficiaries ... (without regard to whether such cost is paid by the employer or
employee)."' Lewin, supra note 253, at 517.
260. Fronstin Statement, supra note 41, at 40.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Lewin, supra note 253, at 517.
264. Id.
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b. HIPAA
Congress passed health insurance portability legislation known as
HIPAA in 1996, with overwhelming support in both the House and the
Senate.16' This legislation included several portability-enhancing
provisions, but its best known provision is one addressing pre-existing
conditions.
Whereas COBRA "'guarantees' portability, as it allows workers to
maintain their current health insurance plan," HIPAA "'improves'
portability as it makes it easier [for individuals with pre-existing
conditions] to get new health insurance on job change. '' 26 Health

insurance plans "often restrict[] or exclude[] plan coverage for the
treatment of health conditions that existed prior to the time the
participant enrolled in the plan., 267 HIPAA's core provision for

preventing job lock was a limit on the length of time for which preexisting health condition clauses can restrict coverage. 268 HIPAA

requires that group health plans reduce the duration of a pre-existingcondition waiting period by one month for every month that an
individual previously had health insurance coverage in another plan.269
HIPAA uses a broad definition of creditable coverage encompassing
almost any type of health plan, including those through private
employers, government group health plans, individual health insurance,
COBRA coverage, Medicare and Medicaid, the military, the Indian
Health Service, and the Peace Corps.270 This creditable coverage is

forfeited, however, if the participant has a lapse in coverage of sixtythree or more days.27'
HIPAA provides further protections to those individuals with preexisting conditions by prohibiting group health plans and issuers of
group health insurance from charging these individuals more than
272
similarly

situated

individuals

based

on

health-related

factors.

Furthermore, if an individual enrolls in COBRA coverage and is unable

265. Kapur, supra note 40, at 283.
266. Fronstin Statement, supra note 41, at 45.
267. Medill, supra note 246, at 496-97 (citing Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability
for Group Health Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 16, 908). "[F]or 1993-94, 46% of participants in private
sector, employer-sponsored health plans were subject to pre-existing condition coverage
exclusions." Id. at 497 n.94.
268. Kapur, supra note 40, at 283.
269. EBRI NOTES Aug. 1998, supra note 221, at 5.
270. Medill, supra note 246, at 499.
271. Id.
272 Id. at 500
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to join another group health plan before exhausting COBRA benefits,
HIPAA guarantees that the individual will have access to health
insurance coverage in the individual market.273
COBRA and HIPAA have been designed to work hand-in-hand,
and COBRA can play an important role in maintaining protections under
HIPAA. For example, COBRA coverage can be used to avoid the sixtythree day break in coverage, and employees are required to exhaust
COBRA coverage before they are guaranteed access to a plan in the
individual market under HIPAA.274 Recognizing the important role that
COBRA plays in portability, Congress also took steps to alleviate the
financial hardship that an unemployed person may face in paying for the
cost of COBRA. HIPAA amended the Internal Revenue Code to
eliminate the 10% penalty on distributions from an IRA before age fiftynine and one-half for those persons who had received unemployment
compensation for twelve consecutive weeks, and who used the
distribution to pay health insurance premiums. 275
HIPAA also addressed the concern that some small employers,
defined as those with between two and fifty employees, were unable to
276
obtain insurance contracts due to their employees' claims experience.
The Act requires any insurer that offers general coverage in a state's
small group market to offer coverage to every small employer that
applies for it,277 and to accept every individual beneficiary within that
278
employer's group.
Furthermore, HIPAA took steps to decrease job lock for those
individuals who might want to leave an employer to pursue selfemployment. The Act raised the tax-deductibility of self-employed
individuals' health insurance premiums from 30%279 to 80% over a tenyear period. 28" Today, self-employed individuals can deduct 70% of their
health care insurance expenses, and such individuals will be able to
deduct 100% in 2003 and thereafter. s'

273. FronstinStatement, supra note 41, at 41.
274. Id.
275. Medill, supra note 246, at 495 n.77.
276. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 62, at 254-55.
277. Id.
278. Donald J. McNemey, Health Insurance Reform, 73 HR Focus 1, Dec. 1, 1996, at 1,
available at 1996 WL 8888949.
279. Danshera Cords, The Medical Savings Account Provision of the HIPAA: Is It Sound
Health and Tax Policy?, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1217, 1226 n.63 (1998).
280. Id.
281. I.R.C. § 162(1)(1) (2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

31

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:173

Finally, the Medical Savings Account (MSA) provision of HIPAA
took progressive steps toward vesting health care plans in the individual
worker.282 This provision was set up as a limited pilot project to allow
Congress time to assess the impact of these tax-favored individual
accounts.283 In order to qualify for participation in the pilot, the
sponsoring employer must have fewer than fifty employees284 and must
couple the account with a high-deductible or "catastrophic" health
insurance plan.
The pilot was intended to stimulate provision of health insurance by
small employers. Employers save money by purchasing low-cost, highdeductible policies for employees instead of more expensive
comprehensive plans, and they can defray employees' out-of-pocket
deductible costs by depositing the remaining cash designated for health
insurance premiums into the MSA. 286 This design shifts more
responsibility to employees by requiring them to make deductible
payments out of their MSAs. 287 Employees also benefit, however,
because any money left in the account at the end of the year belongs to
the employee and rolls over to the next year without being taxed.288
"MSAs give individuals more control over their health insurance
dollars while simultaneously attenuating the relationship between health
insurance and the job market." 8 9 The balance of the MSA can travel with
employees as they change jobs, and catastrophic indemnity (fee-forservice) plans can be more unified across employers than other health
care arrangements that are geographically limited or that limit access to
physicians. Thus, expanding the use of MSAs has the potential to
alleviate job lock, because changing jobs would not necessarily require
workers to change health plans or doctors.29°
PART III: BARRIERS TO PORTABILITY
Although employee benefits have come far along the path to
portability, they still have a long way to travel before reaching full
portability. This section of the article identifies the shortfalls of existing
supra note 25, at 175.
Id.
I.R.C. § 220(c)(4)(A) (2001).
I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A)(i) (2001).
Lewin, supra note 253, at 539.
Id.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

WHITMAN,

288.

Id.

289. Id.
290. Id. at 539-40.
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portability legislation, and discusses those portability barriers that are
inherent in employers' pension and health plan design and offerings.
A. Barriersto Pension Plan Portability
While pension portability has steadily improved, several barriers
remain. Pension legislation allows employers to impose vesting
requirements, requires employers to comply with complicated
administrative requirements, and discriminates against IRAs and
SIMPLE plans in terms of maximum contribution levels. Employers
continue to perpetuate portability loss through their pension plan design,
and those employers who are trying to convert to more portable pension
designs are met with resistance from employees and the government.
The following section explains those obstacles.
1. Inadequacy of Pension Legislation
While legislators have made strides in promoting employersponsored retirement savings plans, those efforts have been neither
progressive nor widespread enough to achieve true mobility. The
following discussion addresses the shortcomings of each of the
improvements in pension law described in the previous section.
a. Vesting
Although ERISA and subsequent amendments have decreased the
maximum service requirements for pension plan vesting, these
requirements still stand as an impediment to worker mobility. Since
most pension plans require several years of service before employees
vest, employees who change jobs frequently may be left without
retirement benefits, 29' and short-service employees may find themselves
job-locked. As long as vesting requirements continue to be imposed,
they will continue to be an impediment to mobility.
b. The 401(k) Plan
Despite Congressional efforts, many employers decline to sponsor
retirement plans due to the associated administrative complexity and
291. Labor Department Study Describes Impact of Job Mobility on Pensions, 15 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 1152 (July 18, 1988) [hereinafter Labor Dep't Study].
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expense. An employer that has no obligation to implement a tax-favored
retirement plan, upon deciding nonetheless to sponsor a 401(k) plan,
must incur substantial funding and administrative costs determined
under vague rules of the Internal Revenue Code.2 92 Even 401(k) plans
consisting solely of employee contributions involve administrative cost
and a certain amount of risk in the implementation of a qualified
retirement plan.9 For example, employer funding costs can be
unexpectedly incurred because non-discrimination provisions may
require employers to provide matching contributions in order to maintain
qualified tax status.294 "To the extent the employer must make matching
employer contributions to sustain plan viability, it will hesitate to
implement or continue a § 401(k) plan."'2 95
c. Rollovers
Although Congress increased the ability to rollover funds from an
employer plan to another qualified plan or IRA, enhanced asset
portability is not likely to have a significant financial benefit for mobile
employees. Although employees would have greater control over who
holds their money, the amount of money held would be the same.296 The
ability to rollover alone does nothing to address the "portability loss"
that is built into the design of many retirement arrangements, in the form
of "back-loaded" defined benefit formulas (discussed infra, section
III.A.2.a.) or forfeitures due to vesting requirements.
d. SIMPLE and IRAs
In spite of efforts to promote small employer plans and individual
savings,297 employer plans remain expensive to sponsor, and savings
limits for both types of plans are small in comparison with those plans
292. Kovach, supra note 149, at 435 n.166.
293. Id.
at 407.
294. Id. at 407 & n.42.
295. Id.
at 407.
296. Willborn, supra note 112, at 349.
297. The most recent effort took place in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). Congress added a small-employer tax credit
of 50% of the qualified start-up costs of adopting a new defined benefit, defined contribution,
SIMPLE, or simplified employee pension. Id. Up to a $500 total credit is available for the first three
years of operation, and qualified costs include administration and retirement-related education. Id.
The effects of this credit remain to be seen, but the amount of the credit is small in comparison with
the risk and expense attendant to plan sponsorship, leading to the conclusion that the credit is
unlikely to have broad effect.
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typically sponsored by large employers. SIMPLE vastly reduced
complexity for small employers, but several of its provisions still inhibit
its effectiveness as a retirement savings vehicle. For example, the plan
requires matching contributions on the part of the employer. Although
SIMPLE arrangements eliminate vague rules characteristic of § 401,
they do not eliminate the indeterminacy of funding costs, because the
employer has no control over employee elective deferrals and associated
matching contributions.298 SIMPLE also caps employee contributions at
$7000 per year299 and prohibits the sponsoring employer from
simultaneously maintaining another tax-favored saving arrangement, 3°°
further limiting the amount an employee can save. IRA legislation has
been similarly restrictive, with a maximum contribution level of $3000
per year.W Although Congress recently increased these limits in the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,302 the new
caps still do not begin to approach the savings allowed under plans
typically sponsored by large employers.3 3
2. Employers' Pension Plan Designs Cause Portability Losses
Even if all legislative barriers to pension portability were removed,
several pension plan design characteristics that lead to portability losses
would remain. Portability losses are principally experienced by shorterservice workers who are covered under defined benefit plans,3° with at
least 75% of all portability losses the result of plan design
characteristics. 3 0 5 Approximately 59% of covered workers experience
some portability loss, with the average pension loss equal to 25% of the
single career benefit.3°6
a. Back-Loaded Defined Benefit Formulas
One defined benefit design characteristic that leads to portability
loss is what is known as a back-loaded benefit formula, meaning that
these plans provide disproportionately higher benefits to older and
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Kovach, supra note 149, at 436.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
Kovach, supra note 149, at 414.
See supra note 101.
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1152.
Id.
Id.
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longer-service employees.0 7 In addition to rewarding long service, these
plans may be designed to anticipate late-age hiring and to provide
adequate retirement benefits to older employees with fewer years of
service.3 °8 Under defined contribution plans, in contrast, employees earn
a steady pattern of benefits over a career. Defined contribution plans do
not exhibit back-loaded features rewarding long service, nor do they
generally
make special accommodations for employees hired later in
39
life.
As a result of these differences, long-service employees covered by
defined benefit plans stand to lose a greater portion of benefits on job
change than do shorter-service employees, thereby making them less
likely to change employers. Conversely, long-service employees covered
by defined contribution plans will never achieve the same long-service
bonus that their counterparts enjoy under a defined benefit regime.30
Older employees considering a job change will likely be hesitant to take
a job with an employer who utilizes only a defined contribution plan or
similar hybrid, since these plans do not make special accommodations
for older workers."' Taken together, these characteristics of defined
benefit plans will tend to decrease mobility of older and longer-service
employees, and to increase their pension losses in the event that they do
decide to change jobs.
b. Failure to Index for Inflation
Another defined benefit design feature leading to portability loss is
the failure to index the vested benefits of separated workers to
inflation. 3 ' Defined benefit plans index for inflation only so long as an
employee remains employed with the plan sponsor. As long as an
307. FUTUREWORK, supra note 79, at 16.
308. EBRI, supra note 54, at 75.
309. But see id. at 72 (stating benefits that defined contribution plan might yield on older
employees). Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001), participants over fifty may make additional elective "catch-up"

contributions each year beginning in 2002. See supra note 102. Elective contributions are those
made by the employee, however, and not the employer.
310. However, fewer and fewer employees can attain the minimum age and service
combination to attain a full pension under a defined benefit formula. The cash balance plan's
smoother accrual pattern over the employee's period of service renders it a much more portable plan
and thus more in sync with today's mobile workforce. Harold W. Burlingame & Michael J. Gulotta,
Case Study: Cash Balance Pension Plan Facilitates Restructuring the Workforce at AT&T, 30
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., Nov. 1,1998, at 25, available at 1998 WL 16141205.
311. Id.; see also supra note 309.
312.

Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1152.
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employee continues to work for the same employer, the "final salary"
element of the pension formula serves to index the employee's pension
to wage inflation. 3" When an employee leaves an employer, however,
the "final salary" element of the formula is frozen at the amount the
employee was paid at the time of separation.3t4
In contrast to defined contribution plans, which allow employees to
take the benefit as a lump-sum and reinvest it, defined benefit plans
typically do not allow participants to collect their benefit until they
become eligible for retirement under the plan." 5 Between the time when
employees leave the employer and when they begin distributions,
however, increasing price levels erode the value of benefits.3' 6 It is
estimated that the failure to index to inflation, the vested benefits of
separated employees, accounts for up to two-thirds of all portability
losses.3 7 Regardless of whether vested pension assets remain in the plans
or are rolled over to an IRA, workers in a series of defined contribution
plans will not experience a portability lOSS.31 8 In either case, the
contributions continue to earn interest or investment returns until the
time of retirement.
3. Barriers to Conversion
Defined contribution plans do not display most of the
characteristics that lead to portability loss under defined benefit
arrangements. Instead, the key barrier to portability associated with
defined contribution plans (or similar hybrids) is the difficulty that
employers experience when trying to convert from a defined benefit plan
to this type of arrangement. The most illustrative example of this
difficulty is the current debate that is associated with the movement to
convert to cash balance retirement plans.3 9
a. Cash Balance Retirement Plan Conversions
Cash balance retirement plans have been receiving a great deal of
attention recently as the pace of conversions to this type of plan has

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Willborn, supra note 112, at 348.
Id.
at 362.
Id.
Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1152.
Id.
Id.
See generally Drigotas, supra note 203.
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increased. ° Cash balance plans have many portability-enhancing
features that make them popular among younger and/or mobile
employees.3 ' They provide larger benefit accruals earlier in a career,
allow employees to take the benefits as a lump sum, and allow benefits
to accrue investment income to keep pace with inflation.32
On the other hand, older and/or long-tenured employees can suffer
financial injury if they continue their entire careers under a cash balance
plan 323 or if they migrate from a typical defined benefit to a cash balance
design.324 The latter is often the case, because employers typically have
not started out with cash balance plans, but have converted to them from
traditional defined benefit plans. 23 Depending on how this conversion is
implemented, the process can penalize an employee who began service
under a traditional design and, who therefore, does not get the advantage
of the relatively high accruals of later service. 26 This has been the
complaint of numerous employees whose employers converted to cash
balance plans.
Attention has been drawn by recent conversions where the
employees complained loudly to the company, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and to Congress. One of the best
known examples is the IBM conversion to a cash balance plan. When
IBM announced its cash balance conversion, the company was planning
to let workers within five years of retirement choose whether they
wanted to remain in the old defined benefit plan or transfer to the new
cash balance plan.32 s In response to the continued uproar from younger
employees, IBM extended this option to all employees with forty years

320. Id.
at40.
321. /d.at41.
322. TOWERS PERRIN, HOT Topics, PERSPECTIVES ON CASH BALANCE PLANS: TIME OUT FOR
FACTS, at http://www.towers.com/towers/hottops/htcbp2.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2000) [hereinafter
TOWERS PERRIN].

323. While some would say that older workers are injured or discriminated against under a
cash balance arrangement, in fact defined benefit plans discriminate in favor of older and longerservice workers, and cash balance participants are simply not benefiting from that favored
arrangement. Id. In Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (S.D. Ind. 2000), the court held
that the switch from a defined benefit plan to a cash balance retirement plan does not violate the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (2001).
324. See generally Drigotas, supra note 203, at 41.
325. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 318.
326. See generally Drigotas, supra note 203, at 41.
327. Id. at 40.
328. Theresa Dixon Murray, Pension Plan Shutdown; How IBM Solves Retirement Fund
Dispute Could Affect the Plans of Workers All Over, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 24, 2000, at I C.
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of age and ten years of service.3 29 The conversion received even more
publicity when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ruled
that the company had to allow a vote on a shareholder proposal that
would extend this option to all employees.330
Employers are not prohibited from changing retirement plans, and
there are few legal restrictions or guidelines on how plan conversions
should take place. The most prominent requirement is imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA, and requires employers to amend
qualified retirement plans in a way that does not reduce the level of
benefits below that which has already accrued to employees. 3
Therefore, in converting a plan, employers must keep track of the
amount of an employee's accrued benefit at the time of conversion, and
ensure that employees who subsequently retire receive at least that
benefit.
Although ERISA protects accrued benefits, it does not prevent plan
sponsors from changing benefit formulas for future accruals or from
discontinuing future accruals altogether.3 This issue is controversial and
surfaces most often as a result of the method the employer uses to
calculate the beginning account balance as part of a cash balance
conversion. Some conversion methods lead to a period of "wear-away,"
which occurs when companies convert the plan in a manner
• 333that leaves
employees with no accruals for a period after the conversion.
There are three basic methods for converting from a traditional
defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan.334 The first method preserves
the participant's accrued benefit under the defined benefit plan as of the
conversion date, and starts a new cash balance account with a zero
balance that begins accruing benefits as of that date. 335 At the time of
retirement, the benefit equals the sum of the defined benefit account and
the amount in the cash balance account.336 Under this approach,
participants continue to accrue benefits at all times and suffer no wear337
away.

329. Id.
330. Reuters, Calpers Steps Up for IBM Workers'
http://cnetnews.com.
331. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 44.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. id.
335. Id.
336. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 44.
337. Id.
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In the second approach, the cash balance account does not start with
a zero balance.338 Instead, the value of the defined benefit plan is
converted to a lump sum in accordance with I.R.C. § 417(e) 33 9 as of the
conversion date, and that amount becomes the opening account
balance. 340 The wear-away in this case, which is particularly difficult to
understand, is a problem driven by the fact that the interest rate required
by § 417(e) may change between the time of the conversion and the
actual retirement."' If the § 417(e) interest rate changes, employees may
experience a period in which they do not accrue any additional
benefits. 342 The possibility of a change in interest rate is the source of the
wear-away. 343
For example, if the § 417(e) interest rate decreases between the
conversion date and retirement, the value of the accrued benefit will be
greater than it was calculated to be as of the conversion date.34 In this
case, the starting balance of the Cash Balance Retirement Account
(CBRA) was actually lower than it should have been; the participant has
no more benefits at retirement than she or he had accrued as of the date
of the conversion, and any contributions to the account after the
conversion only kept the account at the statutorily-mandated level. 345 If
the § 417(e) interest rate increases during this period, however, the effect
can work to the advantage of the participant. 346 In that case, the present
value of the pre-conversion accrued benefit will fall (meaning that the
starting CBRA balance was higher than it should have been), and the
relative value of the participant' s cash value account will increase.347
The third conversion approach is the most controversial because it
generally provides for longer periods of wear-away.348 Although § 417(e)
must be used to keep track of the employee's accrued benefit as of the
date of conversion, the law does not require that employers use § 417(e)
338. Id.
339. Section 417(e) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that a defined benefit plan that
offers a lump-sum option convert the annuity into a lump sum using an interest rate that produces a
lump sum that has minimum value. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 318. When defined benefit plans
are converted to cash balance plans, Section 417(e) must be used in order to calculate the
employee's accrued benefits as of that date. Id.
340. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 44.
341. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 318.
342. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 44.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. id.
347. Drigotas, supra note 203, at 44.
348. Id.
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to determine the opening account balance. Instead, employers are free to

convert the defined benefit annuity to an opening account balance using
any interest and mortality assumptions they think appropriate, even if

they are different than those found in § 417(e).34 9 Depending on the
assumptions used, the opening account balance may actually be lower
than the present value of the participant's benefit in accordance with the
Internal Revenue Code.35° Any additions to the cash balance plan,
therefore, are initially used only to bring the account up to the level
required by § 417(e), resulting in a longer period of wear-away.
Generally, however, cash balance plans "converted from traditional

final pay defined benefit plans provide special transitional benefits for
employees nearing retirement."35 ' These grandfather provisions prevent
the older and/or longer-service employees from losing benefits as a
result of the conversion.352

b. The Government Response
Because of the above-enumerated concerns, the Internal Revenue
Service slowed the conversion process by referring all requests for
determination letters353 regarding cash balance conversions to its
National Office.354 The requirement that IRS personnel request technical
advice before making a CBRA determination has delayed employers'
efforts to convert to cash balance retirement plans.355 This change was

announced in September 1999, and as of April 2000 there were fifty
requests pending in that office.356 At one point it was announced that the

status of these applications would not be determined until a multi-

349. Id.
350. Id. However, if the participant actually retires, the employer must still use the section
417(e) rate (in existence as of the date the participant starts distributions from the plan) to determine
the lump-sum value of the previously accrued benefit. Id. In some cases, that amount may be greater
than the account balance. Id.
351. EBRI, supra note 54, at 112.
352. Id.
353. Determination letters are issued to plan sponsors to indicate whether their plans comply
with the Internal Revenue Code. A plan that does not comply with this code may lose its tax
qualified status. Therefore, cautious employers will wait for a determination letter before
proceeding with a plan conversion.
354. Official Says IRS Has 50 Requests from Plans Seeking to Convert to Cash Balance Status,
Daily
Lab.
Rep.
(BNA)
(Apr.
14,
2000),
available
at
http:/lwww.shrm.orglhmews/articles/bnaO4I4b.htm [hereinafter IRS Has 50 Requests].
355. Id.
356. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

41

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:173

agency review of cash balance plans and plan conversions was
complete. 57
In the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Congress created a new notice requirement affecting employers
undergoing conversions. 58 The new provision, apparently aimed directly
at disclosing the effects of the wear-away problem, requires that "[i]f an
applicable pension plan-is amended to provide for a significant reduction
in the rate of future benefit accrual, the plan administrator shall provide
written notice to each such applicable individual (and to each employee
'
This notice
organization representing the applicable individuals)."359
must be given within a reasonable time before the effective date of the
plan amendment, and the penalty for failing to provide the notice36 is an
excise tax of $100 per day, per individual, until notice is provided. '
B. Barriersto Health Insurance Portability
As in the pension portability framework, improvements in health
care portability have left gaps where the system continues to fail joblocked employees. Job change may still entail lack of health insurance
during an unemployed job search or a waiting period for coverage with
the new employer."' Job change typically requires a change in health
plans, which can also entail a change in premium contributions, covered
benefits, or the employees' physicians. Workers may want to remain
enrolled in a particular health maintenance organization, or may need to
do so to stay with their current physicians, and these idiosyncratic
357. Id. The multi-agency review referred to is a joint effort by the IRS, Treasury Department,
the DOL, EEOC and SEC. There are three areas of particular concern for the regulators:
1. "[Tlhe use of cash balance plans to disguise benefit reductions." TOWERS PERRIN, supra note
318. While benefit reductions are not illegal nor is there intent to outlaw them, there is concern
that reductions should be adequately disclosed;
"[A]ge discrimination issues on the conversion from one formula to the other"; Id.
2.
3.
Benefit accrual issues, especially wear away, "where employees see no additional accruals
under the amended plan for a number of years." Id.
The challenge faced by this multi-agency committee is to balance "participant rights and
protections, while providing employers with the needed flexibility" and to "maintain an
environment in which employers will want to continue sponsoring pension plans." IRS Has 50
Requests, supra note 350.
358. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. §659, 115 Stat.
38(2001).
359. Id. The notice must be "written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant and shall provide sufficient information ... to allow applicable individuals to
understand the effect of the plan amendment." Id.
360. Id.
361. Kapur, supra note 40, at 282.
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preferences may cause "job lock" as an attempt to maintain the status
quo.362 The following section examines these shortfalls and other barriers
to health insurance portability.
1. Legislative Barriers
Congress's attempts to improve health insurance portability have
been well-intentioned. However, neither piece of portability-enhancing
legislation was perfect. COBRA's brand of portability is expensive and
of limited duration. HIPAA's portability is focused primarily on preexisting health condition exclusions, but many workers experience job
lock even if they are not subject to pre-existing condition exclusions
with their prospective employers.363' Equally important is the structure of
the current taxing system, which favors employer-sponsored health plans
and perpetuates job lock by forcing employees to change health
insurance plans when changing jobs. Until these concerns are addressed,
full health insurance portability cannot be achieved.
a. Internal Revenue Code
The structure of the Internal Revenue Code is such that it provides
greater tax benefits to those individuals who obtain health insurance
through an employer plan than from any other source. Section 213 of the
Code 364 addresses individual health insurance purchases, and provides
that individuals can deduct only the amount of insurance expenses that
exceed 7.5% of their adjusted gross income. 6 1 Self-employed individuals
are not subject to the "7.5% rule," and can deduct 70% of their health
insurance premiums in the year 2002 (although the deduction increases
to 100% in the year 2003 and thereafter).366
Section 106(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code),367 in contrast,
gives employees a complete income tax exemption for premiums paid
for employer-sponsored health insurance plans. This section has Served
to entrench our current system of health insurance provision, whereby
the employer selects the health insurance policy provided to employees
362.
363.
364.
365.
expenses

Id.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 213 (2001).
In other words, they must subtract 7.5% of adjusted gross income from their medical
before making any deduction. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, Publication 502, I.R.S.,
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 2 (1999) [hereinafter Publication 502].
366. Cords, supra note 279, at 1226 n.63; see also supra note 281 and accompanying text.
367. 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
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so that the insurance will be considered "employer-provided" in
accordance with this section.
Section 125 of the Code 368 built on § 106 to allow limited choice
among plans. Before the enactment of this section in 1978, employees
were limited to the one health insurance plan provided by employers and
were not allowed to select among several different plans within a benefit
category.369 Section 125 allowed employeesto choose between taxable
forms of compensation and nontaxable benefits, therefore allowing
employees to choose among several plans with different prices."7
Although § 125 plans provide more employee choice, employers are still
responsible for selecting the plans among which employees may choose.
As long as each individual employer is responsible for plan selection and
employees have to obtain insurance through their employers in order to
enjoy full tax deductibility, employees will almost certainly have to
change health insurance plans when changing employers.
b. COBRA Shortfalls
COBRA's limited scope and low rate of participation have
impaired its effectiveness. One reason is the fact that workers cannot
continue indefinitely their old health insurance plan coverage after
leaving an employer.37"' If the new employer does not offer a health
insurance plan, or offers one more expensive than or inferior to that
offered by the previous employer, employees will suffer a benefit loss as
part of the job change. After the maximum period of COBRA eligibility
has been exhausted,3 72 employees may be left with more expensive
benefits, inferior benefits, or no benefits at all. 3 73 Another one of
COBRA's shortfalls is that the law does not protect workers employed
by employers with fewer than twenty employees.374 Consequently,
employees who work for these small employers are not afforded any
portability options for their current health insurance plan.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

26 U.S.C. § 125 (2001).
EBRI, supra note 54, at 354.
Id. at 353.
Lewin, supra note 253, at 517.
Id. at 516, 517.
Id. at 521-22.

PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HEALTH BENEFITS
UNDER THE CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT COBRA 2 (1999), available

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/3
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More disturbing than these shortcomings, however, is that very few
individuals eligible for COBRA coverage elect to use it.375 Of those
individuals eligible in 1994, for example, only 18.2% elected to use it."'
One likely explanation for the low utilization rate is the high cost of
coverage.377 As noted previously, plan sponsors are allowed to charge
COBRA participants 102% of the applicable premium. This figure is
misleading, however, because first glance yields only a 2% cost increase
to employees. In actuality, the employees' costs may be enormously
higher. One reason is that the "applicable premium" generally equals the
total cost of providing benefits under the plan, without regard to whether
such costs are paid by the employer or employee.378 Since sponsoring
employers typically cover some or all of the cost of premiums,
employees are left to pick up the portion previously paid by the
employer and may see a large increase in premium payments.
Furthermore, the money paid for health insurance premiums loses its
tax-preferred status when the employee pays for COBRA coverage.
Whereas employer contributions are tax exempt under § 106, and
employee contributions for health insurance premiums are exempt under
a § 125 cafeteria plan or premium conversion plan, individual purchases
of health insurance are only partially tax-deductible379 and only under
limited circumstances.8 Even if the employer was not making any
sizable contribution towards the premium, but had allowed the employee
to pay for insurance through a § 125 premium conversion plan, the
mobile employee will experience a premium increase equal to the
amount of the lost tax advantage.
Yet another explanation for the low utilization of COBRA benefits
may be the problem of adverse selection.38 ' The Employee Benefits
Research Institute offers an example to illustrate this problem:
Under the health plan, the annual premium for a family plan is
$10,859. However, the actuarial cost of the plan varies greatly

375. Lewin, supra note 253, at 517.
376. EBRI, supra note 54, at 454.
377. Lewin, supra note 253, at 517.
378. Id.
379. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
380. Only those individuals who file form 1040 may make deductions for medical expense
deductions (those who file 1040A or 1040EZ cannot make such deductions). Publication 502, supra
note 365, at 1. The effect of this requirement is to make those individuals who do not itemize (who
generally tend to be less wealthy than those who do itemize) or who have no tax liability (because
they have little or no income) ineligible for this tax subsidy.
381. EBRI, supra note 54, at 455.
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across workers. The actuarial cost for workers under age 30
would be $4,524, and the actuarial cost for workers aged 55 and
over would be $12,759. If a worker chooses COBRA coverage,
the premium would be $11,076, or 102 percent of the annual
premium faced by the employer. Young individuals would have
an incentive to forgo COBRA coverage, while older workers
would have an incentive to accept COBRA coverage. As a
result, the COBRA coverage pool of insured workers is
adversely selected-meaning only relatively older, relatively
unhealthy individuals will choose COBRA coverage .... 382
Therefore, COBRA's premium pricing rules may lead younger and
healthier individuals to forego coverage and pay out-of-pocket as
services are rendered, since the expected costs of doing so will be less
than the cost of the COBRA premium.
c. HIPAA Shortfalls
Like its counterpart COBRA, HIPAA leaves us far from achieving
real health insurance portability. The Act's name itself is misleading,
because "portability" does not entail carrying a specific package of
health benefits from one job to another or into periods of
unemployment.383 Portability in HIPAA simply captures the notion that if
an individual has maintained health insurance coverage, the next
employer plan must waive or limit any pre-existing condition exclusion
that would otherwise apply.38 4 "Unlike the protection COBRA provides,
portability under HIPAA does not mean that an insured individual
' Neither law guarantees that a worker
actually retains the same policy."385
will have access to health insurance coverage on the new job, nor that
health insurance on a new job will be affordable.8 6 Even with HIPAA
protections, workers who change jobs may still have to change health
or may experience coverage
plans or health care providers,
interruptions caused by eligibility waiting periods.188 Therefore, HIPAA
does not achieve total portability, which would be realized if the worker
did not have to change health plans on job change.389
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 455-56.
Lewin, supra note 253, at 521.
Id.
Id. at 522 (footnote omitted).
FronstinStatement, supra note 41, at 45.
Id.
Lewin, supra note 253, at 522.
EBRI NOTES Aug. 1998, supra note 221, at 5.
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Given that HIPAA's primary portability feature is the reduction of
pre-existing condition periods, HIPAA actually benefits a small portion
of the job-locked population. Only 16% of individuals who reported that
they or an immediate family member had experienced job lock were
affected by a pre-existing condition.39 It is those areas that HIPAA
ignores that are largely responsible for job lock. Thirty-six percent of
individuals reporting job lock attributed it to the prices of health
insurance at a new employer, 25% said it occurred because the
prospective employer offered a health plan that covered fewer benefits
than the current employer, and 15% of respondents reported that they
experienced job lock because the prospective employer did not offer
health benefits.3 91
Even HIPAA's pre-existing condition provisions cannot guarantee
that an employee or other beneficiary will be covered under the new
health insurance plan, and several HIPAA loopholes have the potential
to pose problems in the future. 392 For example, HIPAA provides that in
order for an individual to be exempt from pre-existing condition
exclusions, she or he must demonstrate that there was no break in his or
her prior coverage exceeding sixty-three days.3 93 There is some evidence,
however, that insurers may drag their feet while processing COBRA or
insurance applications, thereby causing workers to go without coverage
for over sixty-three days and lose HIPAA eligibility.3 94
Furthermore, because HIPAA does not prohibit restrictive
insurance policies, "it effectively allows insurers to structure their
benefits to 'act [] as preexisting condition exclusion[s].' ' 395 "By
designing the terms of a plan to exempt certain conditions from coverage
for a set period of time [under the guise of a waiting period], insurers
obtain nearly the same result as if they had implemented pre-existing
condition exclusions., 396 The difference is that the waiting period applies
to all employees who join the plan, not just those who come to the plan
with a pre-existing condition.3 97 Furthermore, while pre-existing
condition limitations prevent employers from discriminating against
individual employees who have such conditions, there is no protection

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id. at 6.

Id.
Lewin, supra note 253, at 531.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Lewin, supra note 253, at 531.
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against employers simply dropping that type of coverage from the plan
for all employees.
Despite HIPAA's advances, job lock persists in the form of
reluctance to join small companies that do not offer health insurance.398
While HIPAA did take steps to ensure that small employers would be
guaranteed the right to purchase health insurance plans, it did nothing to
address the affordability of those plans. Unless individual states have
legislation aimed at price control, insurers could charge small employers
exorbitant rates. 399 "So, even though coverage might be 'available' in a
technical sense-since it is being offered in the marketplace-it might
be too expensive for any small firm to buy it.' '4°° The expense of

providing health insurance is a big factor for small companies who do
not have the purchasing influence of their larger counterparts. 4' Many
small companies therefore choose not to offer health benefits at all, or if
they do, they do not provide benefits comparable to their larger
counterparts.4 °2 A 2000 study4 3 found that only 60% of firms with fewer
than ten workers offered benefits, compared to 99% of firms with more
than two hundred workers.4 0 Those small businesses that do offer

insurance are feeling the brunt of increased medical costs and tend to
shift this burden to their employees.4 0 ' Finally, there is a great deal of
skepticism regarding whether HIPAA's Medical Savings Accounts will
actually solve the portability dilemma. When HIPAA was passed, both
proponents and opponents believed that MSAs would be a popular
product. Participation in the MSA program, however, has fallen far short
of expectations.4 6 Furthermore, even if participation were at expected
levels, critics claim that the only people who will opt for MSAs are
those who are "either healthy enough not to require much health care or

398. WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 174.
399. McNerney, supra note 278, at 1.
400. Id.
401.
Charles Ornstein, Patchwork System Makes Universal Coverage Difficult, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 26, 2000, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
402. Id.
403. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST;
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, 2000 ANNUAL SURVEY (2000).
404. Ornstein, supra note 401.
405. Id.
406. Although MSA legislation had allowed for as many as 375,000 accounts to be established
by the first interim cap date of April 30, 1997, the IRS reported that only 9720 MSAs were
established by this date. Jefferson, supra note 173, at 724. Between January and June of 1997, only
22,051 MSAs had been opened, a number significantly below the interim cap of 525,000 accounts
set for June 30, 1997. Id. The number of accounts created through June 30, 1998 was only 50,172,
which is significantly below the applicable interim cap of 600,000. Id.
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wealthy enough to afford the high-deductible payments of a catastrophic
policy. ' 0 7 If this happens, there is a fear that adverse selection 4°, will
bankrupt the health insurance system "by allowing low-risk, wealthy
individuals to drop out of mainstream coverage, leaving behind a pool of
individuals who will drive up the insurance rates.4
2. Employer Plan Offerings and Employee Health Plan Selection
Barriers to portability also exist in terms of employer health
insurance offerings and the types of plans in which employees choose to
participate. One type of disparity exists between large employers and
small. For example, approximately 75% of employees working for
medium and large employers participate in employer-sponsored medical
plans, 40 whereas only 64% of employees working for small private
establishments have employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.411
This disparity in health insurance coverage will tend to serve as a barrier
for workers moving from larger companies to small, because of the
increased likelihood of losing insurance.
Moreover, barriers to portability exist because employees are
increasingly participating in nontraditional plans that limit their choice
of doctors, making it more likely that employees will have to switch
doctors when changing jobs. For example, of those participants in
employer-sponsored plans, 73% of employees working for medium and
large employers participate in non-traditional plans; 33% of those were
in HMOs and 40% were in PPOs (leaving only 27% to participate in the
more mobile fee-for-service plans).4 2 In contrast, in 1991, 17% of
employees were in HMOs, 16% were in PPOs, and 67% were in

407. Lewin, supra note 253, at 539.
408. The theory behind adverse selection is that the cost of insurance will be driven up if
employees are allowed to select plans based on how they foresee their medical needs for the next
year. For example, employees who foresee few medical needs during the year are likely to choose a
low-cost, less generous health insurance plan. EBRI, supra note 54, at 258. Those employees who
enroll in the most generous and most costly health insurance plans are those who think they are
likely to have greater health care costs during the year. Id. As a result, the average cost of the most
generous plan is likely to rise much faster than the cost of the least generous plan. Id. Therefore, if
insurers are to accurately price the more generous plans (in order to cover their costs for the year),
they will need to adjust or "reprice" the health plans to reflect the actual expected costs subsequent
to the initial offering and enrollment in the plans. Id. To the extent that repricing is not possible,
adverse selection may eventually bankrupt the insurer. Id.
409. Lewin, supra note 253, at 539.
410. BENEFITS 1997, supra note 151.
411. BENEFITS 1996, supra note 151.
412. BENEFITS 1997, supra note 151.
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traditional fee-for-service. 43 Employees who work for small employers
demonstrate a similar pattern. In 1996, of those participating in
employer-sponsored plans, 62% had signed up for non-traditional
insurance; 27% of those participated in HMOs, and 35% in PPOs
(leaving only 36% to participate in fee-for-service plans).4 4 In contrast,
in 1990, 14% were in HMOs, 13% were in PPOs, and 74% were in feefor-service plans.1 5
PART IV: POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED PORTABILITY
Having identified the shortfalls of portability legislation and those
barriers characteristic of employers' pension and health insurance plan
design and offerings, the following section examines possible remedies
for the portability dilemma. The discussion highlights the arguments
both for and against various proposals, but avoids taking a normative
position in the debate.
A. Expanding Pension Plan Portability
Legislative and employer design changes have increased pension
portability, especially in terms of workers' ability to transfer pension
assets between employers. While these changes have improved workers'
opportunity to manage their accounts, they have done little to increase
the amount in the accounts. To solve the job lock problem, it will be
necessary to address the "portability loss" associated with job change.
The author's research has identified four key possibilities for taking on
this issue: (1) shortening or eliminating vesting requirements; (2)
indexing defined benefit accounts to inflation; (3) allowing employees to
carry service credit with them to a new employer; or (4) expanding
individual pre-tax retirement savings limits to the same maximums as
employer-sponsored plans. The following section discusses these
options for increasing portability, as well as the costs and distributional
implications accompanying each.

413.
414.
415.

Id.
BENEFITS 1996, supra note 151.

Id.
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1. Shorten or Eliminate Vesting Requirements
Perhaps the simplest proposal for increasing pension portability is
to shorten the maximum allowable vesting requirements or to require
that employees vest immediately in qualified retirement plans.4 6 While
one would think that such proposals could reduce job lock by improving
pensions for short-tenure employees, empirical data shows that this
proposal would actually do little to alleviate job lock overall. Although
the change would entitle some additional workers to pension benefits,
the changes would have relatively little impact on overall pension
losses-immediate vesting would reduce the benefits that the average
pension-covered worker loses by only 4%.4.7
Critics of this proposal claim that mandated vesting would do little
to increase the retirement benefits of its intended beneficiaries and
would have the detrimental effect of reducing benefits for other plan
participants. 18 Using an economic efficiency argument, they predict that
the mix of cash compensation and benefits before a vesting mandate is
the efficient one. 419 Therefore, they argue, following a vesting mandate,
benefits for short-tenure employees will eventually be driven back down
to pre-mandate (efficient) levels. 420 Due to ERISA's non-discrimination
requirements, however, retirement plans would not be able to respond by
reducing benefits of only short-tenure employees, but would also have to
reduce benefits for those plan participants who highly value them.4 2' If
the pension plan's ability to provide retirement benefits to employees
who prefer them is diminished, the plan will become a less valuable
compensation mechanism.422 Voluntary retirement plan sponsorship only
exists as long as the plans provide value to the employer and the
employees.4 23 Therefore, critics argue, if legal rules make it impossible to
provide retirement benefits to those employees who value pension
benefits more highly than alternative forms of compensation, fewer
416. Peter M. van Zante, Mandated Vesting: Suppression of Voluntary Retirement Benefits, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 125, 129 n.10 (1999). The most recent example of this is, of course, the

Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001's reduction of vesting requirements
for employer matching contributions under a 401(k) plan. See supra note 133 and accompanying
text.
417. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001).
418. van Zante, supra note 416, at 129 n.10.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 128-29.
422. Id. at 129.
423. van Zante, supra note 416, at 129.
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retirement plans will be sponsored and more plans will be terminated. 4
In sum, critics argue that "[m]andated vesting is a destructive policy
when measured against its effect on aggregate retirement benefits. The
retirement benefits of short-tenure employees are not enhanced, but plan
coverage 42is5 suppressed, and the benefits of long-tenure employees are
reduced.,
2. Index Defined Benefit Accounts to Inflation
A second portability proposal would be aimed at alleviating some
of the portability loss associated with defined benefit plans. As
previously mentioned, it is estimated that indexing these benefits to
inflation could eliminate up to two-thirds of portability loss.426 Indexing
might take such forms as insuring against inflation with governmentissued bonds, or allowing deferred vested participants to withdraw their
benefits at the time of job change so they could be transferred to another
investment vehicle.427
However, to promise employees a benefit indexed for inflation is to
promise employees a larger benefit, and this increased benefit would
mean that the employer has to bear additional funding costs. For
example, an indexing scheme that allows the employee to accrue interest
on vested benefits will deprive the employer of investment results that
would otherwise be retained by the plan to fund other pension benefits.
Since this indexing scheme would allow investment results to accrue to
the separated employee rather than the pension trust, employers would
eventually have to make larger contributions to the plan in order to fund
other pension benefits.
The alternative scheme, allowing vested employees to take their
entire benefit at the time of separation, so that they may invest it
elsewhere, causes similar problems. This scheme naively assumes that
the employer has the entire amount of the promised benefit sitting in an
account at the time of the employee's separation. In fact, in defined
benefit plans
the employer is responsible for making contributions to a trust
adequate to ensure that the promised pensions can be made from
the pooled fund. The amount of contributions required will
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 129-30.
Id.at 218.
See supra text accompanying note 317.
Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1153, 1154.
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depend on a complex actuarial analysis which takes into
consideration factors such as the age, length of service, and
expected attrition of employees, projections of future salary
increases, and the rate of return'on plan investments.
Because they consider employee age and investment results in the
funding formula, employers may place fewer dollars in the pension trust
today and rely on investment results to achieve a fully funded benefit by
the time the employee reaches retirement. If employees can withdraw
their pension benefit at the time of separation, which may occur decades
before the employees would be eligible to retire under the plan, the
employer will have to fund the benefit immediately. Thus, the employer
will lose out on the time value of money and forfeit some potential
investment results. This requirement could also result in cash flow
problems and could force the pension trust to liquidate investments at
429
inopportune times. Moreover, this requirement could adversely affect
other participants. If the plan is underfunded, the early transfer of assets
equal to 100% of the present value of the separated employee's benefits
would increase the level of the plan's underfunding and reduce security
for the remaining participants.43 °
3. Allow Employees to Carry Service Credit to a New Employer
A third proposal to increase pension portability, and one that
envelops the two preceding proposals, is to allow employees to carry
service credit with them when they change employers. This idea is not
new. Ten years ago, human resource strategists predicted that
"[i]ntercorporate and interindustry agreements for pension portability
will become commonplace by the turn of the century," and "[c]ombined
employer funding of such plans will become a major concern of human
resources professionals." 4 1 With the turn of the century now behind us,
we have yet to realize this prediction.
The ability to transfer service credit could be beneficial for
participants in either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. 432 The
most beneficial aspect for participants in defined contribution plans
would be that it would serve nearly the same purpose as reducing or
428. Willborn, supra note 112, at 347 n.7.
429. Id. at 362-63.
430. Id. at 363.
431. Kenneth A. Kovach & John A. Pearce 11, HR Strategic Mandates for the 1990s, HR
Focus, Apr. 1, 1990, available at 1990 WL 2517454.
432. Willborn, supra note 112, at 347.
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eliminating vesting requirements. For example, an employee who
changed jobs every three years would never vest if each of his or her
employers imposed five-year cliff vesting rules. 33 Under a scheme of
transferable service credit, however, the employee could vest after two
years with his or her second employer and with every employer
thereafter. 34 The ability to transfer service credit would permit more
employees to vest and to receive amounts that they would otherwise
forfeit.
The ability to transfer service credit would be even more important
in defined benefit plans. In addition to alleviating vesting requirements,
carried service would eliminate both the inflationary problems and the
portability loss usually associated with back-loaded benefit formulas. By
allowing an employee to transfer years of service to a new employer and
to insert those years into the pension formula, the employee would
receive the same benefits as one who remained with the same employer
for his or her entire career.436 Carrying service credit would allow the
wage-indexing property of the "final salary" component of the pension
formula to combat inflation,437 and would allow mobile employees to
benefit from the back-loaded features of defined benefit plans.
While portable service credit might eliminate the mobility problem,
it may also impose enormous financial and administrative burdens on
the pension system. Because a system of portable service credit will
allow employees to receive benefits that would otherwise be forfeited to
employers, either as a result of vesting requirements or plan design, the
system will increase pension benefits for the worker while
commensurately increasing costs for the employer(s).438 The question of
who ultimately carries the burden of this increased cost will depend on
the administrative design of the system and on the employer's response
in terms of plan design.
Designing an administrative system to support portable service
credit, while fairly distributing the increased costs of the system, could
prove to be immensely difficult. The simplest option may be to allocate
all costs to the new employer, whereby each new employer agrees to
recognize the service credit and pay the unvested benefits of transferring

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Willbon, supra note 112, at 348.
Id. at 352.
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workers. 4 ' 9 New employers, however, are "unlikely to be willing to
accept the transfer of service credit if assets were not available to
support the ultimate payments of benefits." 4 Therefore, this portability
scheme would probably require that old employers transfer the assets
that accumulated on behalf of the worker in the previous plan to the new
employer (thus allocating the costs to the old employer). 441 Another
option might be that "the old employer could agree to use the worker's
final salary with the new employer to calculate its pension obligation
(which would allocate the increased costs to the old employer)."" 2 In
another variant, the new employer could "use all of the worker's years of
service to calculate its pension," and then "offset the total" paid by the
"amount the worker receives from the old employer" (which would
allocate most costs to the new employer)." 3 Alternatively, the two
employers could agree to a cost-sharing arrangement, such as totaling
the costs at the end of each year and dividing equally between them."4
This option could become very complicated, however, where the
employers' workers transferred from, and to, numerous different firms.
Determining who bears the cost of carried service credit will not
only depend on the arrangement between employers, but also on the
flow of employees between them."5 For example, an arrangement in
which the old employer transfers the worker's unvested assets to the new
employer tends to allocate the increased costs to the old employer (who
would otherwise recapture the forfeited assets). The actual distribution
of the costs between the two employers, however, will depend on their
experience with transferring workers."7 If only one worker transfers, for
example from Employer 1 to Employer 2, Employer 1 would bear all of
the costs of enhanced portability. 448 However, if one worker leaves each
firm and goes to the other, "(and each has equal unvested amounts), the
costs would be distributed evenly between the two employers." 9 The

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 350.
Id. at 350 n. 14.
Id.
Willbom, supra note 112, at 355 n.30.
Id.
Id. at 355 n.29.
Id. at 352-55.
Id. at 354.
Willborn, supra note 112, at 355.
Id.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

55

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:173

actual cost distribution between the employers therefore depends on both
the allocation rule and the employers' experience under the rule.
Cost and administrative burdens would be further complicated by
the fact that employers do not use the same funding strategies,
contribution rates, or defined benefit formulas. Even a plan that appears
to allocate costs to the former employer may actually impose part of the
costs on the new employer. For example, if the old employer's plan were
underfunded, the amount allocated to the transferring employee would
be less than the present value of the promised benefit, and the new
employer would eventually have "to make up the difference. 45 Even
more complicating, however, is that plans differ on a number of
parameters such as employer contribution levels, eligibility rules, the
coefficient used in the benefit formula, and how final salary is
calculated.4 2 Service credit portability would create a relationship among
two or more different plans, and would require that pension plans deal
with some of these differences when allocating costs and paying
benefits. 453 Finally, another problem in this area is that some employers
inevitably go out of business,
which in itself creates a myriad of
45 4
complications for this strategy.
An administratively simpler option would be to create a quasiportability scheme that permitted the worker to transfer service credits
only if she or he provided assets to support their ultimate payment

55

or

employer.456

purchased service credits from the new
The allocation of the
increased costs under this scheme would be between the worker and the
new employer, and would depend heavily on the purchase price.
a. Reaction Under All Three Proposals-Labor Market and
Distributional Effects and Employer Responses
Before selecting any of the preceding proposals, it would be
necessary to consider the distribution of the increased benefits, as well as
the labor market effects and their implications for the future of the
pension system. The effects of a new portability rule would differ in a
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
(August
455.
456.
457.

Id.
Id. at 354-55 n.28.
Willborn, supra note 112, at 362.
Id. at 363.
E-mail from Lawrence M. Becker, Director of Corporate Benefits, Xerox Corporation
30, 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).
Willbon, supra note 112, at 350 n.14.
Id. at 352 n.19.
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static world from a dynamic world. As such, this article discusses each
separately.
In a static world, the proposed changes would mean that employers
lose and workers win,458 with "the magnitude of the increased benefits
for workers" equaling the "magnitude of the increased costs for
employers.,' 45 9 The increased benefits "would not be distributed
uniformly across all workers,4 60 however, but would only benefit mobile
workers who would have otherwise suffered'a portability lOSS. 46
Although the world may appear static in the short-run, in the longrun it is dynamic and allows for employer reactions. Therefore, any of
these proposals are likely to induce additional changes in the pension
system.462 If employers knew about the portability rule in advance, they
would likely minimize or even eliminate the increased cost burden.463
For example, they might shift costs back to employees by lowering
overall benefit levels for participants, 464 by decreasing the defined benefit
formula's coefficient, by changing the way in which years of service or
final salary are calculated, or by reducing the rate of future salary
increases.46' Alternatively, some employers might substitute defined
contribution arrangements for defined benefit pension plans in order to
at least shift investment risks to employees. 66
Distributional issues in a dynamic world are complex and either
employers or workers could emerge as winners.4 67 "If employers react to
enhanced portability by making precisely offsetting reductions
elsewhere, there would be no net increase in costs to employers or
benefits to workers. Instead of magnitude effects, enhanced portability
would have only distributional effects. 468 Stationary workers would be
likely to suffer an overall loss, because they would likely receive
469
decreased pension benefits as employers attempted to recoup costs.
Mobile workers, in contrast, would gain from enhanced portability,
because the benefits they receive would be greater than the loss they

458. Id. at 358.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

Id.at 355.
Willborn, supra note 112, at 355.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
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Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1152.
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Labor Dep't Study, supra note 291, at 1152.
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Id.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

57

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:173

would suffer from an altered plan design. 7 ° Whether the new portability
rule is desirable would then depend on one's view of the propriety of the
distributions between types of workers "rather than on any overall
benefits flowing to workers from employers. ' 7'
Regardless, it is unlikely that all employers would be able to make
offsetting changes equal to the amount of increased costs due to
portability. Labor market or political factors may interfere with their
efforts, or employers might be unable to make a precise estimate of the
offset necessary to recoup CoStS.47 2 To the extent that employers underoffset in their cost shifting, employees would receive a net benefit; to the
extent that employers over-offset
due to calculation problems, workers
73
loss.
net
a
suffer
would
One should also consider the labor market effects that a change in
portability rules might provoke. "Employers offer pensions, not out of
the goodness of their hearts, but because pensions serve certain
functions, such as retaining good employees, motivating them, and
,regulating retirement flows." 47 4 Portability would interfere with the
ability of pensions to perform these functions both by making it more
difficult for pensions to serve these functions and by making it more
expensive to do so.475 The problem is that those elements of plan design
that lead to portability losses are precisely those elements that employers
view as effective workforce management devices to encourage loyalty
and longevity of service.476 An appropriate balance, therefore, needs to
.be found between lowering barriers to reasonable work force mobility on
the one hand, and encouraging unnecessary turnover on the other. 77
Otherwise, employers might exercise another option "when portability
interferes with their ability to use pensions to pursue their employment
objectives: offer fewer and less generous pensions." 478 This balance
"between portability and the availability of pensions ... makes
4 79
consideration of labor market effects critical in the portability debate.
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4. Expand Individual Pre-Tax Retirement Savings Limits
Rather than impose portability mandates that would modify
employer-sponsored plans, Richard Kovach claims that the best
portability solution is to allow IRAs to enjoy tax preferences comparable
to those enjoyed by large employer plans. Arguing that the new
psychological contract has eliminated paternalism in most aspects of the
employment relationship, he believes the time has come to empower all
employees to make retirement savings decisions for themselves under a
universal, expanded IRA system.480
Kovach is not an advocate of the traditional pension system. He
argues that retirement savings vehicles for individuals and small
employers do not adequately address the problem of access to retirement
income security, because they do not allow savings opportunities
comparable to those for large employers.4 8' He believes the primary flaw
in the current pension system "stems from the combined effect of trying
to compel plan sponsoring employers to pay additional deferred
compensation [in the form of minimum contributions or matches], while
giving them near exclusive control over employee access to tax-favored
retirement savings. '48 2 Believing that all American workers should have
an opportunity to accumulate substantial tax-favored retirement savings,
Kovach complains that even less complicated retirement plans like
SIMPLEs and 401(k)s preclude -individual participation without
employer sponsorship.483 He emphasizes that employers are free to reject
plan sponsorship for almost any reason, 84 and often do so because of the
funding costs, time, attention, and risks involved in the implementation
and maintenance of a plan.
Kovach believes that the recent popularity of cash or deferred
arrangements points to an overall trend toward employee 'self-reliance.486
As support for this assertion, he notes that the new. psychological
contract has put employees in charge of their own development and has
practically eliminated the expectation that an employee will remain with
an employer until retirement.
He therefore concludes that it is
anomalous to allow retirement funding to remain under employers'
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

Kovach, supra note 149, at 437.
Id.
at 420.
Id.
at 435.
Id. at 409, 420.
Id. at 409.
Kovach, supra note 149, at 409.
Id. at 437.
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control. 48' Kovach advocates removing the burden of the pension access
choice from employers and placing it directly on employees. 48 9 He
believes that "[s]hifting the burden of plan sponsorship would eliminate
substantial complexity, because uncomplicated, self-funded IRAs
already exist. ' 490 The only change he would require is raising the annual
contribution limitation for IRAs from $3000 to a figure set somewhere
between the $11,000 limitation under 401(k) plans and the $40,000
limitation on other tax-favored defined contribution plans.49 '
Kovach even goes so far as to suggest that Congress abolish
employer sponsorship of most tax-favored retirement plans.492 He
believes this would place no hardship on employees, even if it meant
that employer contributions otherwise paid under conventional
employer-sponsored retirement plans would cease.493 Kovach argues that
employees could command compensation equal to their former direct
and deferred compensations, and replicate their former employer
contributions to qualified retirement plans with substantial IRA
contributions.494 In fact, he believes the system may be superior because
employees would be empowered with complete economic freedom over
their retirement income security.495
Not everyone agrees with Kovach. Opponents note that while the
new employment contract puts workers in charge of decisions affecting
their career development and savings levels, there have been no
fundamental changes that make individuals better equipped to manage
security risks.496 Critics contend that employees still need protection
through the pooling of risks, even in the area of savings for retirement.497
Opponents of Kovach draw opposite conclusions, believing that riskpooling may be even more important today, because we are now more
aware of increasing life expectancy and the need for major reserves
during retirement. 99

488. Id. at 422-23.
489. Id. at 422.
490. Kovach, supra note 149, at 422.
491. Id. The dollar figures cited by Kovach have been changed to reflect the amounts provided
by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38(2001).
492. Id.
493. Id. at 436.
494.

Id.

495.
496.
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Kovach, supra note 149, at 436.
EBRI NOTES 1996, supra note 84, at 2.
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Pension research has also uncovered some patterns that are
troubling for Kovach's proposal. Statistics show that when individuals
make their own retirement security decisions; they often do not make
them wisely. 9 When left to decide whether to participate in a 401(k)
savings plan, more than one-third of workers decline to participate.5" Of
those workers who changed jobs and took lump-sum distributions of
their retirement accounts, nearly three-quarters failed to roll over these
investments into another tax-qualified plan. 0 ' Moreover, workers with
the lowest income levels also have the lowest rates of savings
participation and rollover. 2 Eliminating a paternal stance on retirement
savings would likely ensure that these individuals have inadequate
retirement income.
Moreover, this article adds an additional challenge to Kovach's
proposal. His assertion that workers would be able to replicate employer
contributions through an expanded IRA scheme may not be entirely
correct. Employer contributions to qualified plans are not treated as
wages subject to Social Security and unemployment taxes.03 Under
Kovach's scheme, employers would be subject to payroll taxes on this
money and, therefore, would not be willing to pay the same amount to
workers as under the current system.5 0 For employers to maintain
expenses at current levels, employees would lose some portion of their
current income, because the employer would pay that money to the
government in the form of employer payroll taxes.
B. Expanding Health Insurance Portability
As with pension portability, the health insurance portability
problem might be solved "by completely unlinking health-insurance
coverage from the employment relationship."5' ' 5 With one problem
solved, however, we would be opening the door to several others. Any
solution to health insurance portability will have to be implemented only
after careful consideration of the distributional consequences and the
risk that we may drive the health insurance industry out of business
entirely.
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1. Government Provision of Health Insurance
"One mechanism for severing the tie between employment and
health insurance would be some form of government-provided insurance
financed by taxes and furnished as a matter of right to every citizen or
resident., 50 6 This option would achieve the goals of tying health
insurance to an individual and alleviating job lock, while at the same
time avoiding some insurance pitfalls (such as adverse selection) that
would be associated with other proposals. The enormous costs of
transitioning to such a system, coupled with the difficulties, that other
countries are experiencing with their national health-insurance schemes,
make the likelihood of adopting such a scheme very small.0 7 Indeed, the
failure of such a proposal in the early years of the Clinton administration
makes it unlikely that government-provided health care will appear any
time in the near future. Brown University political science professor
Darrell West has analyzed the failure of the Clinton proposal, saying:
The problem with health care is that it's very easy to divide and
conquer, just because people have such different interests and
different fears and different experiences.
The fear was that we would end up with a lowest-commondenominator health-care system. In elevating the poorest
elements within society, we might in the process lower the
quality of the care received by others.08
West believes that a real push for government reform will come
when the middle class sees massive increases in health-insurance
costs:" Similarly, Katherine Stone of Cornell Law School predicts that
if a large number of workers who formerly had employer-provided
health insurance and pension no longer do, then it will be imperative to
impose these obligations on the local, state, or federal government.1
With the Patients' Bill of Rights pending in Congress, " there was

506. Id. at 175.
507. Id.
508. Ornstein, supra note 401, at IH.
509. Id.
510. Stone, supra note 26, at 616-17.
HEALTH & WELFARE [hereinafter
at http://www.towers.con/towers/services-products/towersperrin/hw.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2001) . Whereas earlier versions of the Patients' Bill of Rights included

511.
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recently fear that this could come to fruition sooner than we might have
otherwise expected. More than one-third (36%) of U.S. employers
surveyed by Hewitt Associates reported that they would probably drop
health care benefits for their employees if provisions of the bill were
enacted that would allow patients to sue their employer-sponsored health
plans.5' 2 The two versions of the bill currently pending, however, have
adopted provisions allowing employers to avoid liability, thus averting
the expected employer reaction and the potential crisis in the provision
of health care."'
Given the enormous complexity of government-provided health
insurance and that Congress recently rejected a proposal to create such a
system, this article does not dedicate any further discussion to it.
2. COBRA Expansion
Perhaps the least radical way to increase health care portability
would be to remedy the deficiencies that exist in current portability
legislation. For example, COBRA could be amended to increase the
length of time that beneficiaries may purchase coverage, the law's
requirements could be extended to smaller employers, or the costs of
COBRA coverage could be mitigated by government subsidies or tax
incentives.
The problem with COBRA expansion is that it is an expensive
proposition for employers. As discussed previously, due to adverse
selection, those individuals who elect COBRA coverage are a higher risk
population than the general workforce. Consequently, the average claims
costs for employees with COBRA coverage are equal to 155% of the
claims costs for active employees.5 4 Any expansion of COBRA,
affecting either the size of the firm covered or the length of time that
former workers are eligible for continuation coverage, would increase
employer insurance costs. Other measures, such as subsidies or tax
incentives for workers to elect COBRA coverage, would increase the
percentage of eligible workers electing COBRA coverage. While this
might reduce the degree of adverse selection if individuals at the margin

controversial provisions for employer plan liability, the current versions of the bill allow employers
to avert liability unless they participate directly in health care decisions. Id.
512. HMO Legislation Could Threaten Health Coverage, (Jan. 26, 2000), at
http://www.benefitnews.com/nw.cfm?id=681 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
513. TRACKING CHART, supra note 511.
514. EBRI, supra note 54, at455.
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now accept COBRA coverage, it would still drive up the overall claims
costs for employers, especially those who are self-insured.'
Other changes to COBRA might help to alleviate the higher health
care costs associated with continuation coverage. One option would be
to allow workers to choose from plans that are similar to the current
plan, but that are not as costly for the employer, such as plans with a
higher deductible." ' Alternatively, allowing differential pricing based on
the anticipated cost of the participant would also mitigate costs. For
example, younger employees could be charged lower premiums based
on their lower expected costs to the plan, thus helping to alleviate the
adverse selection problem. Yet another option would be to amend the
law to increase the premiums that COBRA beneficiaries may be
charged, in order to ameliorate the
higher level of claims costs
5 7
beneficiaries.
COBRA
with
associated
Each of the above options would have adverse consequences for
mobile employees. However, if COBRA were to be expanded without
accompanying measures to combat employer costs, employers may
resort to ways to reduce, shift, or eliminate the impact of this increased
cost.5 8 For example, employers may require active employees to make
higher premium contributions, reduce or eliminate health care benefits
for active employees to reduce COBRA continuation coverage, or
reduce the size of the workforce eligible for health insurance benefits by
substituting part-time for full-time employees." 9 Other alternatives for
employers include passing additional costs to workers in the form of
lower pay increases or to consumers in the form of higher prices.520
3. Internal Revenue Code Amendments
A second proposal for severing the tie between employment and
health insurance is to expand the use of "privately paid personally
owned health-care plans vested in the individual worker, which would
follow the worker from job to job."52' Marina v.N. Whitman suggests
that the place to start is to amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow
individuals to deduct the full cost of health insurance premiums. 522 This
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

Fronstin Statement, supra note 41, at 4 1.
Id.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 45.
Id. at46.
Fronstin Statement, supra note 41, at 46.
WHITMAN, supra note 25, at 175.
Id.
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proposal would provide individuals more flexibility in selecting a health
insurance plan, and would eliminate the need to work for an employer
who sponsors a health insurance plan in order to receive full tax
deductibility of premiums.
4. Employer-Driven Expansion-Defined Contribution Medical. Plans?
Another possible solution is to do for health plans what employers
have already done for pension plans-to offer them on a defined
contribution basis. Although many human resources professionals
secretly acknowledge that this idea is long overdue, most employers are
presently afraid . to implement . it due to, employee. relations'
considerations. 23 In the mean time, new companies are emerging in
anticipation of this change,524 organizations are holding conferences to
explore the possibilities,5 25 and employer groups such as the Washington
Business Group on Health are forming employer groups to explore the
future of employer sponsored health care. 26

523. Shari Caudron, Employee, Cover Thyself, 79 WORKFORCE 34 (Apr. 2000),
http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/00/04/58/. Because early critics of defined contribution
health dubbed it a "benefits takeaway" and "cut and run" straiegy, the term "defined contribution
health plan" has strong negative connotations. Peter Mead, First-GenerationDC Health Plans
Continue
Rollout,
EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT
NEWS
(Feb.
2001),
at
http://www.benefitnews.com/pvf.cfm?id=960. As a result, vendors have abandoned the title and are
instead using terms such as "self-directed" or "consumer-driven." Id. Vendors are also using such
terms as "defined care" or "DC-squared" (which stands for defined contribution dot com). Sandy
Lutz & Steven J. Henkind, The Web Fuels Interest in Defined Contribution, at
http://www.definedcare.com/submit34.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
524. A list of such companies is available. See http://www.morehealthoptions.com (last visited
Oct. 12, 2001).
525. The Center for Studying Health System Change (HSC) held a conference entitled
"Defining 'Defined Contributions': New Directions for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Coverage?" in Washington, D.C., on October 10, 2000. CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM
CHANGE, Conference, Defining "Defined Contributions": New Directionsfor Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance Coverage? (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Defining "Defined Contributions"], at
http://www.hschange.org/index.cgi?conf=main HealthCareAmerica presented a conference called
"The Defined Contribution Alternative" on June 21-22, 2001 in Chicago, Illinois See
HEALTHCAREAMERICA, Conference, The Defined Contribution Alternative (June 21-22, 2001), at
http://www.hcamerica.org/dcla.htm. Likewise, Global Business Research, Ltd., held a conference
entitled "Consumer-Driven & Defined Contribution Healthcare: A Critical Look at Emerging
Models, Plan Design & Employee Choice" on July 12-13, 2001, in Chicago, Illinois. GLOBAL
BUSINESS RESEARCH, LTD., Conference, Consumer-Driven & Defined Contribution Healthcare: A
Critical Look at Emerging Models, Plan Design & Employee Choice (July 12-13, '2001), at
http://www.global8.com/H808IH808intro.html.
526. E-mail from Lawrence M. Becker, Director of Corporate Benefits, Xerox Corporation
(Aug. 30, 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).
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a. How Defined Contribution Might Work
The idea of a defined contribution health insurance plan is not
entirely new. Since the cafeteria plan was started in 1974,527 some
employers have been giving workers a set amount of money annually
with which to purchase health care coverage, and allowing employees to
choose among several plans.528 In such arrangements, employees can
purchase less expensive plans and use the remaining allowance to buy
other benefits, or employees can take the cash.5 29 Alternatively,
employees can add personal funds to the employers' contributions to
purchase more deluxe coverage. 530
A true defined contribution system, however, would take the
cafeteria plan one step further. Instead of allowing employees to use
their "benefits allowance" to choose one of several plans offered by the
employer, this system would allow the employees to take the money and
purchase any health plan they choose on the open market. Employees
would then shop around for plans that meet their individual health
needs.53"' This system is based on the belief that consumers-not their
employers-are in the best position to know what kind of health care
they need and how much they want to spend for it.5" 2
b. Hurdles to Defined Contribution Plans
The defined contribution approach sounds simple in theory, but
there are several problems that would have to be addressed before such
plans could become a reality. "'Redefining the deal with employees,

527. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
528. Ron Winslow & Carol Gentry, Medical Vouchers: Health-Benefits Trend: Give Workers
Money, Let Them Buy a Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2000, at Al.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Caudron, supra note 523.
532. Id. This idea of consumerism is one of the driving forces behind the movement toward
defined contribution health care. As one proponent of defined contribution health plans explained,
"[hlealthcare is a failed marketplace today, because the person paying the bill isn't the one choosing
the service." Jill Elswick, Business Models Emerge for Consumer-Driven Health Care, EMPLOYEE
(Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Elswick, Business Models, Part I], at
BENEFIT NEWS
http://www.benefitnews.com/health/detail.cfm?id=1773 (quoting Howard Wizig, Chairman of the
Board for Vivius, Inc.) . In addition to consumerism, other "Iforces pushing the concept toward
reality include rising health costs ....distrust of managed care, demographic shifts, the need for
individualized approaches to health treatment and the emergence of e-health." Jill Elswick, Some
Say DC Health "Inevitable," EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS (July 2001) [hereinafter Elswick, DC
Health], at http://www.benefitnews.com/pfv.cfm?id= 1578.
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which has5 33traditionally been more paternalistic, is going to have some
hurdles.'One problem is maintaining the full tax deductibility of employer
and employee premium contributions. Second, employers will have to
develop systems to administer their benefit allowance payment and to
provide employees with tools they need to make informed health care
decisions. Third, a defined contribution system could make individual
plan purchases exorbitantly high as employees shop in the individual, as
opposed to the group, health insurance market. Fourth, employers and
insurance underwriters would have to find alternative ways to calculate
risks and combat adverse selection under this new scheme. Finally, the
role that employers play as champions of high quality care and access
could get lost in a defined contribution system. The following sections
describe these problems, and ways that they may be overcome.
c. Leaping Hurdles Along the Path to Defined Contribution
While defined contribution health plans might not be fully feasible
today, there are ways to counter the problems noted above and to
continue moving toward defined contribution plans. As discussed in
section IV.B.3., tax deductibility could be addressed through
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code to make individual health
insurance purchases fully tax deductible. Section 106 of the Code,
however, appears to leave open the possibility of defined contribution
plans even absent a Code amendment. Plan administration and providing
employees with information can both be addressed via the Internet with
the emergence of websites that address insurance plan selection and
administration. The high costs of individual pricing could be addressed
by mandating a system of community rating in premium pricing or by
forming other types of purchasing groups. Adverse selection can be
addressed by alternative methods of insurance risk adjustment. Finally,
quality concerns (as well as cost and adverse selection concerns) can be
addressed by allowing groups other than employers to act as employee
advocates and exercise group purchasing power.

533. Elswick, DC Health, supra note 532 (quoting Ken Berkowitz, consultant with
PricewaterhouseCoopers).
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i. Maintaining Tax Deductibility of Premium Contributions
Even absent a change in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §
106(a) 34 appears to leave the door open for a defined contribution
system. This section states: "General Rule. Except as otherwise provided
in this section, gross income of an employee does not include employerprovided coverage under an accident or health plan. 5 35 This language
has served to entrench our current system of health insurance provision,
whereby the employer selects a policy or several policies and offers
them to its employees on a pretax basis. As long as each individual
employer is responsible for plan selection, an employee will almost
certainly have to change health insurance plans when changing
employers.
The statutory language, however, does not inevitably lead to this
situation. This section's accompanying regulations provide clarification,
stating, "[t]he employer may contribute to an accident or health plan
either by paying the premium (or a portion of the premium) on a policy
of accident or health insurance covering one or more of his employees,
or by contributing to a separate trust or fund." 536 This language diverts
the focus of the tax advantage away from the fact that the insurance is
provided by the employer, and instead focuses on the fact that the
employer pays all or a portion of the insurance premium. The suggestion
is that employees may be able to choose an individual health insurance
policy in the market and maintain the tax advantage as long as the
employer pays for a portion of it.
One obvious disadvantage of such a scheme would be the difficulty
of administration. Employers would have to design a complex network
of administration to verify that an employee is enrolled for coverage
with the plan and to pay premiums to hundreds of different insurance
carriers. Internet-based benefit administration companies, such as
eBenX, would provide one way to meet this need. Founded in 1993 as a
network management services provider, eBenX furnishes solutions to
improve the efficiency of the procurement and administration of group
health benefits. 37 With custom electronic connections to health plans
(collectively serving approximately 85% of the managed care enrollment
in the United States), the company facilitates the flow of eligibility and
534. I.R.C. § 106(a) (2001).
535. Id.
536. 26 C.F.R. § 1.106-1 (2000) (emphasis added).
537. eBenX, About eBenX: Managing the Health & Welfare Benefits Supply Chain [hereinafter
About eBenX], at http://www.ebenx.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
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financial data between employers and health plans."' In addition to
software to facilitate enrollment and payment, the company provides
consulting services, including health plan selection and contracting and
performance management. 9
While today's Internet and software applications may assist in this
administration, an alternative solution may be to give the money directly
to employees and allow them to make the premium payments. Although
this may be an attractive alternative for employers, it is not without
limitations. There is little case law to provide guidance, but the opinions
interpreting this section of the Internal Revenue Code14 make it clear
that payments made directly to an employee for the purchase of health
insurance, "without any use restrictions" 5 4' do not qualify for privileged
tax status. The implication of this qualification, albeit in dicta, is that
employer payments with use restrictions may qualify for preferred tax
status. If that is the case, then perhaps employers could meet the "use
restriction" requirement by creating a benefits system whereby
employees are given money to purchase benefits via vouchers or debit
cards . 142
ii. Administration and Tools for Informed Choice
As mentioned above, Internet companies are emerging that can
assist employers with the complicated administration of a defined
contribution system. Likewise, Internet companies are also developing
websites that can assist employees in plan selection. eBenX is one such
company, providing not only administrative services to assist employers,
but also tools to help employees select the right insurance plan.13 Other
websites are emerging, such as www.plansmartchoice.com, which are
interactive and help employees to make insurance decisions based on
their priorities, preferences, and tolerance for risk.

at
Services,
Exchange
and
Connectivity
538. eBenX,
http://www.ebenx.com/services/connexsvcs.html (last visited Sept. 10. 2001).
539. About eBenX, supra note 537.
540. See, e.g., Adkins v. United States, 882 F.2d 1078, 1080, 1081 (6th Cir. 1989).
541. Id. at 1080.
542. Dr. Sally Trude, a senior researcher at HSC, concurs that the use of vouchers can preserve
the tax deductibility of employer contributions. See, e.g., Dr. Sally Trude, Overview of Defined
Contributions, Address Before the Center for Studying Health System Change Conference (Oct. 10,
2000), in Defining "Defined Contributions": New Directions for Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance?, at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/275/2.html.
543. About eBenX, supra note 537.
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Lawrence Becker, -Director of -Corporate Benefits at Xerox
Corporation, laments that "the market in general lacks the sophisticated
tools to understand the products and services. 544 He notes that the
complexity of issues like quality of providers, plan constructs, and the
relative safety of various institutions all lead workers to leave these
issues in the hands of their employers. 4 1 "There are tools such as
Consumers' Digest for commodity purchases, but no such counterpart in
the healthcare setting. 5 46 Becker notes further, however, that
organizations "such as Leapfrog (www.leapfroggroup.org) and Planlinx
(www.planlinx.com)" are developing systems to address some of these
problems. 47
"To make the transition, employers will have to reposition
themselves from health care benefits decision makers to health benefit
decision enablers. 5 48 By partnering with organizations such as those
listed above, employers may be able to administer defined contribution
systems, while at the same time encouraging employees to become
better health care consumers. Defined contribution advocates believe
that "[b]y implementing defined contribution, combined with innovative
Web technology,. . . costs can be driven down while employee
satisfaction rises. 549
iii. Addressing Costs Through Community Rating
One of the problems associated with individual health insurance
purchases is that the price for an individual is much higher than that for a
participant in a group health plan. This is not true, however, across all
insurers or regions of the country. Some insurers or localities use
community rating as the method of premium determination.
Community rating bases premiums on expected costs for all
policyholders, with low-cost individuals or groups (e.g., young, healthy
individuals) helping to fund participants requiring more extensive
hospitalization services through a cross-subsidy of premium
contributions.5 The practice of community rating is almost as old as
health insurance itself, even dating back to Blue Cross's first plan in
544.
(August
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

E-mail from Lawrence M. Becker, Director of Corporate Benefits, Xerox Corporation
30, 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lutz & Henkind, supra note 523.

Id.
Solomon & Asaro, supra note 62, at 237.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/3

70

Ulrich: You Can't Take it with You: An Examination of Employee Benefit Po

2001]

You Can't Take It With You

1929." 5' The health care pricing system changed dramatically, however,
with the appearance of commercial insurers. These insurers generally
rejected community rating, and instead "employed experience rating
under which the premium rate for each employer group was based on
historic costs for that specific group.15 2 Commercial insurance
premiums thus became cheaper for employers than the community-rated
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, because they offered low premiums to
employers with groups of relatively healthy, low risk employees-a
' This system of experience rating
practice known as "cherry picking."553
contributes to employers' ability to purchase health insurance plans at
discounted prices. Today, many Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans have
followed suit, departing from community rating and utilizing experience
rating for large employee groups.
The practice of community rating has a history of Congressional
support. Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973"5' to "encourage the growth of HMOs" and to establish
"requirements for an entity seeking designation as a federally qualified
HMO." 55 One of the Act's requirements was that federally qualified
556
HMOs must community-rate their services.
In 1988, however,
amendments to the Act allowed employers to abandon community rating
for negotiated group rates based on the expected costs of providing
services to the employee group. 557
One way to maintain affordability of individual health insurance
purchases would be to mandate a community-rated pricing system,
perhaps by repealing these 1988 amendments to the HMO Act. This
repeal would ensure that health insurance prices for all individuals
would be the same, regardless of employment or health status, and
would help to alleviate job lock as workers leave large employers for
smaller employers or self-employment.
The key disadvantage of a community rating scheme is that it may
promote adverse selection. In any scheme where young, healthy
participants are partially funding older, less healthy participants, there
will be an incentive for the former group to choose no coverage and pay
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
benefits
Id.
556.
557.

Id.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239-40.
Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e-17 (2001)).
EBRI, supra note 54, at 237. "Under these requirements, HMOs must offer certain
and satisfy federal regulations for administrative, financial, and contractual arrangements."
Id.
at 239.
Id.
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for services as they receive them, since the anticipated cost of services
would be less than the cost of purchasing insurance. This choice would
leave only older and less healthy participants in the insurance pool,
which would either reduce profits for the insurance company or increase
premiums for the remaining participants.
iv. Combating Adverse Selection Through Risk Adjustment
Providing employees with unlimited choice in selecting health
insurance plans will also exacerbate the problem of adverse selection. A
new company in Cleveland, Ohio, may have found a solution to this
adverse selection problem: risk adjustment. 58
HealthSync is among the new companies in the emerging defined
contribution market. Part of HealthSync's strategy is a plan to combat
the adverse selection problem by rearranging premium payments to
reflect the true risk that an insurer faces.5 In HealthSync's arrangement,
the "price tags" that employees see for each insurance plan would be
merely tools for collecting money on behalf of each employee to
contribute to the employer's plan account. '6 The actual amount of the
"price tag," however, would not necessarily be transferred to the
insurance plan in which the employee enrolled.56 Instead, once all of the
contributions from an employer pool were consolidated into an employer
plan account, HealthSync would analyze which employees selected what
plan, and would assess the actual expected costs to the plan for each
employee based on risk factors.5 62 Those plans that enroll older and less
healthy employees would actually receive more money per employee
from the pooled account than reflected in the price tag, while those plans
that enroll younger and healthier employees would receive less in
premium contributions than reflected in the price tag.5 6 This method
would allow employees to select the health plan that best met their
needs, and simultaneously protect the insurance carriers against the

558. Defining "Defined Contributions," supra note 525. In an HSC conference, on October 10,
2000, HealthSync's CEO, Ray Herschman, used the term "risk adjustment" when describing the
company's strategy for combating the adverse selection problem.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Defining "Defined Contributions," supra note 525; see also Guam Medical Society, No
Insurance; Middleman, at http://guammedicalsociety.com/data/Fmessages/19.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2002).
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uncontrolled costs normally associated with adverse selection.i 64 By
organizing workers into groups, such as employer affiliations,
HealthSync will be able to analyze the real anticipated costs for each
plan participant and compensate the insurance carrier accordingly, thus
defeating the problem of adverse selection.565
eBenX is developing an analogous plan to address adverse
selection. The plan includes "sort[ing] participants according to 10 levels
of health risk: the young and healthy in category 1, and older people
with chronic ailments in 9 or 1O. ' ' 5 66 The company will then "assign
vouchers different values according to a person's risk and invite insurers
to bid for consumers in each category. 5 67 Thus, insurers will receive an
amount in premiums equal to their actual expected costs for insuring
each group, and will not suffer financial loss attributable to adverse
selection.
v. Other Groups as Employee Advocates
Even if employers step out of their traditional role as employee
advocates in the selection, design, purchasing, and monitoring of health
insurance plans, there are other groups waiting in the wings that would
like to fill this void. For example, employee benefit firms are emerging
as a center for quality and price control. Other groups that have
traditionally represented employee interests, such as unions, may also
play a central role in the provision of health insurance. In addition, new
groups are emerging that would like to represent employee interests in
the health insurance arena.
1. Employee Benefit Firms
Frank McArdle, a principal at Hewitt Associates LLC, does not
expect to see a defined contribution approach to health benefits any time
soon.16 William Falk, a Towers Perrin principal, notes that simply
providing employees with a "pot of money" is not the answer, because
individuals have so few insurance coverage options.569 He believes that

564. Defining "Defined Contributions," supra note 525.
565. See generally id.
566. Winslow & Gentry, supra note 528.
567. Id.
568. Carolyn Cosmos, Credit Unions Eye Benefit Services, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS (Apr. 1,
2000), at http://www.benefitnews.com/subscriber/00 04_01/coverl.htm.
569. Id.
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some group or organization, such as an employee benefit firm, needs to
step in as an intermediary to provide benefits. 7 °
In response to this call, approximately twenty vendors either
presently operate in this market or were preparing for a launch by the
close of 2001.57 Eight of these vendors recently collaborated to form the
Consumer Driven Health Care Association (CDHCA), an association
working to raise the profile of defined contribution health plans and to
reach agreement on terminology for describing it. 72 The CDHCA has
already identified five distinct business models being used by companies
in this market." 3 These business models, and companies that use them,
are described as follows:
1. Decision Support: The company provides online tools and personal
assistance to help employees choose among multiple health plans
that are priced by varying deductible levels. 74 Companies using this
model include Definity Health, Lumenos, and Sageo.575
2. Benefit Design: The company encourages health care consumerism
by requiring employees to make a broad variety of coverage
decisions, such as choosing among hospitals, provider networks,
pharmacy plans, alternative medicine coverage, vision care, and copay levels. 76 Companies using this model include Choicelinx and
Destiny Health.577
3. Health Plan Catalog: The company requires employees to choose
some level of health coverage, and employees may put the
remaining funds into an accrual account to be used for any qualified
medical expense."' Companies using this model include eBenX and
MyHealthBank.579
4. Time-of-Need Network: The company offers products, such as
negotiated discounts on dental and vision care, alternative therapies,
pharmacy benefits, or infertility counseling to supplement traditional

570. Id.
571. Mead, supra note 523.
572. Elswick, Business Models, Part 1,supra note 532.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Jill Elswick, Business Models Emerge for Consumer-Driven Health Care, EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT NEWS (Sept. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Elswick, Business Models, Part 2], at
http://www.benefitnews.com/pfv.cfm?id= 1841
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. id.
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health insurance products."' Companies using this model include
HealthAllies and Healthmarket.58" '
5. Advance Selection Network: The company allows consumers to
build their own provider network by selecting a hospital and
individual physicians before the time services are needed.
Companies utilizing this model include Vivius and Buyers Health
Care Action Group. 82
The variety among these business models illustrates that "'[d]efined
contribution is simply a funding strategy,"' and that "[t]here's no such
thing as a defined contribution company. 5 3
2. Unions
With the decline in the percentage of unionized employees,5 little
attention has been paid to union efforts to address the portability issue.
There are existing provisions in tax and benefit law, however, that
enable unions to play a key role. Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947585 provides for the establishment of
"multiemployer plans" to provide pension or welfare benefits (including
health insurance) to employees on a tax-preferred basis. 6 A
multiemployer plan is one that covers the workers of two or more
unrelated companies in accordance with a collective bargaining
agreement. 7 Multiemployer plans tend to be concentrated in those
industries comprised of many small companies, each too small to justify
an individual company plan.18 They are also found in industries where
irregular employment and high mobility would result in few workers
qualifying under an individual employer's plan if one were to be
established. 9
The American Nurses' Association provides one example of a
national union taking advantage of a multiemployer plan specifically to
address the portability problem. In 1988, the union set up a national
pension program designed to provide portable retirement benefits to
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.

Id.
Elswick, Business Models, Part 2, supra note 576.
id.
Id. (quoting Robert Christadore, President and CEO of Benefits Alliance).
EBRI, supra note 54, at 154.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2001)).
EBRI, supra note 54, at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
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nurses who were not vested in an employer-sponsored pension plan.590
The union designed this plan to address the high mobility characteristic
of the profession, which prevented most nurses from remaining with an
employer long enough to become vested. In the year before the plan was
implemented, 55% of full-time registered nurses had worked less than
five years for their current employer. 9' Also, nearly one-third of all
registered nurses worked part-time and were rarely covered by pension
plans. 592 The plan consists of three savings plans for nurses who hold
membership in state nurses' associations.593
The portability of multiemployer plans themselves is also on the
rise. Congress recently decreased the maximum vesting requirements,
from ten-year cliff vesting to either the five-year cliff vesting or sevenyear graded vesting, to be consistent with all other ERISA-governed
plans. 94 Furthermore, international unions have been encouraging
reciprocity agreements among multiemployer plans, allowing workers to
shift from one employer to the next and among different plans without
losing pension credits.9 Multiemployer plans therefore serve as a viable
way to reduce the portability problem among unionized employees, and
could perhaps serve as a selling point in union organizing efforts.
3. Employee Communities
Rachel Geman notes that "[t]he decline of union participation, the
powerful status of the contemporary American corporation, and the
tendency of legislative attention to focus on individual employee
rights.., have all combined to leave a void in employees' proactive role
' She proposes that our
in safeguarding and promoting their own rights."596
current legal system be supplemented by legislative encouragement and
support of employee communities. 97 Geman criticizes our current
system of employment-centered benefit provision, noting that
"[e]mployees should have benefits that accrue to them because they are

590. National Voluntary Pension Program Offered by American Nurses' Association, 15 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1789 (Oct. 17, 1988).
591. Id.
592. Id.

593. Id.
594. Yakoboski, supra note 71, at 3.
595. EBRI, supra note 54, at 153.
596. Rachel Geman, Safeguarding Employee Rights in a Post-Union World: A New
Conception of Employee Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 370 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).

597. Id.
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'' She
workers, not because they are workers for a given company."
believes that workers, not corporations, should be the starting point for
making legislative decisions, 99 and that "[a]s a means and as an end, the
law must encourage worker self-help through community. ' 6°°
Several such employee communities have been emerging that
might serve as intermediaries for employees and provide benefits to
workers generally. A description of two such communities follows.

a. Credit Unions
A recent editor's note at Benefitnews.com. highlighted the
possibility that credit unions will enter the benefits delivery business.60 '
In some states, credit unions have already started offering supplemental
insurance products to employers, such as cancer or dental insurance. 60'
At least two statewide credit union associations, one in Colorado and
another in Kentucky, are considering pilot projects that could offer
complete health insurance packages. 63
The Colorado Credit Union Association is planning its expansion
into the benefits arena in anticipation that employers will eventually
move to defined contribution health insurance. 6°4 However, in some
states, including Colorado, the law currently prevents affiliations other
than employers from purchasing group health insurance plans.6 5 The
Credit Union Association is teaming with the 'Colorado Bar Association
to lobby for a change in this law.6°6
The Kentucky Credit Union League has taken a different approach
than group purchasing, and is pursuing self-insurance. 67 The League
plans to extend benefits to all credit union members.0 8
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b. Working Today
Working Today is an advocacy organization whose agenda is
focused on developing a new labor infrastructure that responds to the
changing organization of work and supports the mobile workforce. 60 9 As
part of this agenda, Working Today is developing a strategy that would
link benefits directly to individual workers. One of the organization's
goals is to develop a Portable Benefits Fund that will deliver health
insurance within the community-rated market, as well as retirement
savings products, to independent workers.60 The aim of the Portable
Benefits Fund is to create a new benefits delivery model for those
workers who are not connected to a long-term employer. 6 ' The
organization's goals, in creating this fund, are to:
Allow individuals to carry benefits with them from job to job;
Reduce insurance premium rates through product customization,
group purchasing, and lower marketing costs;
Encourage long-term participation to counter adverse selection
by creating incentives to stay within the fund, as well as by
setting re-entry requirements for people who have dropped out
of the fund; and
6' 2
Link health insurance to a retirement-savings product.

Recognizing that many workers are members of groups like
professional organizations, unions, trade associations, or community and
faith-based groups, the Portable Benefits Fund is built around this
natural organization in the marketplace. A central aspect of the fund is
an eligibility requirement that requires workers to either work in a
selected industry, or to be linked to a partner organization, such as those
listed above. 613 The role of the intermediaries is to act as access points to
609. Working
Today,
Your
Voice
in
the
Policy
Debate,
at
http://www.workingtodday.org/other/ouragenda4.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2000).
610. Working Today, The Problem: No Safety Net for the New Workforce (on file with the
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. A
list of Working Today's partner organizations can be found at
http://www.workingtoday.org/about/intermediaries.html (last visited Oct. 11,2001).
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the Portable Benefits Fund, acting both as a communication channel to
inform members about the fund and as a means to counter adverse
selection. A minimum of three months of organization membership is
generally required before workers are eligible for fund participation.6 4
While the primary goal of the Portable Benefits Fund is to provide
independent workers with access to high quality, affordable insurance
and retirement savings products, a secondary purpose is to help
61 5
strengthen those organizations that represent workers' interests.
Working Today hopes that this partnering strategy will enhance services
for independent workers by taking advantage of group purchasing
power, while simultaneously generating revenue to increase the selfsufficiency of groups that serve the mobile workforce.6"6 Working Today
believes that these local groups can best meet freelancers' other
concerns, including career development, professional training, and
networking.6 7
The pilot Portable Benefits Network launched on September,
2001, 61' and was made available to independent workers in New York's
Silicon Alley (covering new media, traditional media, and high-tech
industries). 619 The organization selected this population because it
believes it is an ideal model of the new workplace and because the rate
of uninsurance within this group is approximately 34%.62 0 Furthermore,
it wanted to pilot with a group where cross-subsidization across income
lines would be possible and where some participants could partially pay
for their premiums.62' Working Today believes this will better create the
infrastructure necessary for controlling adverse selection, reducing
administrative costs, and efficiently delivering insurance.622 The
infrastructure resulting from the pilot will later be leveraged for an
expansion to low-wage workers.623
The Portable Benefits Network offers a multi-tiered product, to
reflect the balance between choice and price demanded by those
614. Working Today, Participation & Eligibility Rules: Initial Eligibility, at
http://www.workingtoday.org/about/eligibilityrequirements.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
615. Working Today, The Problem: No Safety Net for the New Workforce, supra note 610.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Working Today, About Us, at http://www.workingtoday.org/about/aboutwt.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2001).
619. Working Today, What the Portable Benefits Network Can Do for Individuals: Changing
Times, at http://www.workingtoday.com/about/individuals.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
620. Working Today, The Problem: No Safety Net for the New Workforce, supra note 610.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id.
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surveyed for the pilot. 6 4 The design centers around a comprehensive

HMO offered through HIP Health Plan of New York.625 Coverage
includes doctor and specialist visits, prescription drug coverage,
hospitalization, emergency room services, preventative dental coverage.
and discounts on other dental work.626 The organization plans to
eventually add an option to go completely out of the network for a
higher deductible and co-insurance. 627 The goal is to create a product
2

with considerable choice while maintaining an affordable premium1 1
The Portable Benefits Network also bundles health insurance
products with other services to reduce plan turnover and to create
629
incentives for continuous participation. It includes a retirement savings
product, as well as group-rate disability and life insurance. Working
Today anticipates that if the Silicon Alley pilot is successful, it will
serve as a model for insuring the uninsured working poor. 63' The
organization's aim is not to replace the employer-based insurance
market, but to supplement it with a delivery system for health insurance
for the individual market that reduces adverse selection, encourages
632
for all.
broad participation, and results in more affordable premiums
PART V: CONCLUSION

Having completed a survey of employee benefit portability, it must
be concluded that employee benefit portability has been steadily
increasing over the last several decades, both as a result of portabilityenabling legislation and because of changes in the offerings of
employer-sponsored benefits.
Although employee benefit portability has been on the rise, we
have not yet achieved full portability. Employees who change retirement
plans still suffer from "portability loss" due to vesting requirements, the
failure to index benefits for inflation, and back-loaded defined benefit

624. Id.
625. Working Today, Portable Benefits Network Products & Services, Health Insurance, Can
You
Afford
Your
Own
Health
Insurance?,
at
http://www.workingtoday.org/productsservices/healthdental.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
626. Id.
627. Working Today, The Problem: No Safety Net for the New Workforce, supra note 610.
628. Id.

629. Id.
630. Working Today, Products & Services, Overview: How Can We Help You?, at
http://www.workingtoday.org/productsservices/products.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
631. Working Today, The Problem: No Safety Net for the New Workforce, supra note 610.
632. Id.
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formulas. While remedying these problems is possible, the result would
have distributional implications for workers and cost implications for
employers. An alternative solution, the expansion of IRAs, would place
responsibility for retirement savings completely in the hands of
employees, who have consistently done a poor job of handling their own
retirement accounts.
Likewise, health insurance remains a major cause of job lock for
employees. Job change often entails a lack of health insurance during an
unemployed job search or a waiting period for coverage with the new
employer, and typically requires a change in health plans, premium
contributions, covered benefits, and physicians. True health insurance
portability will not be possible unless we vest health insurance in the
individual worker, perhaps by creating defined contribution health
insurance plans. Before these plans can become a reality, systems must
be developed to enable tax-deductibility, administer enrollment and
premium payments, ensure that employees are making informed choices,
lower the costs of individual health insurance premiums, combat adverse
selection, and ensure continued health plan quality. Third-party
intervention appears to be the solution to these problems, with employee
benefit firms, unions, or some other independent organization playing an
intermediary role.
. Moreover, it is important to note that achieving pension and health
insurance portability still may not eliminate the job lock phenomenon.
Employers offer other benefits that employees value and that may act as
a barrier to job change. COBRA does not provide portability of most
other employer-sponsored benefits, nor does HIPAA's pre-existing
condition limitation apply to other valuable benefits like life insurance
or long-term disability plans.633
A portability solution is difficult to select for two interrelated
reasons. 634 First, choosing a solution involves difficult questions about
the costs and distributional effects of changes in the portability rules.635
Second, choosing a solution is difficult because any portability changes
affect not only the ability of employees to transfer benefits, but also the
calculation employers and insurance companies make when deciding
whether to offer insurance benefits at all.636 Each improvement for a
633. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Administrative Challenges Presented by New HIPAA
Rules, 6 BENEFITS IN BRIEF NEWSL (July 1997), at http://www.morganlewis.com/bib0797.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2001).
634. Willborn, supra note 112, at 345.
635. Id.
636. Id.
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mobile worker has the potential to result in a corresponding cost increase
to employers, insurers, or long-service employees, or to lead to the
elimination of that benefit offering altogether. Before making any further
advances toward true portability, it will be necessary to consider
carefully the ramifications of that decision, and to take the course of
action that will result in a net gain to employees.
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